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Criminal justice system involvement and continuity of youth crime: 
a longitudinal test of labeling theory 
Lee Michael Johnson 
Major Professor: Ronald L. Simons 
Iowa State University 
Adolescent crime is a major issue confronting not only the criminal justice system 
and the general public, but researchers as well. Studies of criminal careers reveal several 
possible factors explaining persistent offending. At one time, labeling theory was a 
popular explanation for continued deviance, but a lack of empirical support and 
conceptual objections soon made the theory unpopular. In this analysis, labeling theory is 
integrated with other theories and then re-considered as an explanation for persistent 
youth crime. The primary contention here is that formal legal sanctioning—in the form of 
involvement with the police, courts, and correctional agencies—may. ironically, operate as 
a factor sustaining persistent offending. Seven waves of data collected on 153 males 
were used to test a model hypothesizing relationships among criminal justice system 
involvement, association with deviant peers, and crime—over time. Results revealed 
continuity in offending across waves, but only partial continuity in deviant peer 
association. More importantly, consistent with labeling theory, criminal justice system 
involvement was positively related to later crime, as well as to later deviant peer 
association. Further, crime was positively related to later deviant peer association, but 
2 
deviant peer association was not related to later crime, and same-time correlation between 
the two were significantly positive. While, understandably, crime predicted criminal 
justice system involvement, deviant peer association did not. Based on these results, 
labeling processes should be viewed within a life course perspective, and implications for 
theory, research, and treatment are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This analysis explores the possibility that children who get involved with the 
criminal justice system continue their illegal behavior as a result of this involvement. 
I use longitudinal data from the Iowa Youth and Families Project (IYFP) to test a 
structural equation model arguing that criminal justice system, involvement plays a 
mediating part in youth crime continuity. Here, I am proposing what many theorists 
already have—that societal reactions to crime by formal social control agents are 
responsible for a portion of crime. Thus, it seems logical to take an approach that 
would fall under the rubric of societal reaction theory. In particular, the proposition 
that social responses to crime lead to more crime is fundamental to labeling theory. 
This analysis explores a timely issue important not only to deviance scholars, 
but to professionals working with troubled youth as well as the general public. The 
public is given much to worry about with regard to children and teenagers as a safety 
threat, especially with media reports of youth crime ranging from petty theft to gang 
violence and school shootings. While it is safe to assume that citizens generally want 
to be protected from crime, a civil society is also faced with constructing well-
conceived humanitarian efforts to help persons inhibiting their quality of life with 
their own behavior. It is fairly apparent that efforts by criminal justice and social 
work agencies, as well as others in the community, have not stopped youth crime to 
the extent most of us would like. Herein, it is my intent to confront the problem of 
understanding why certain youth persistently offend despite aggressive efforts by 
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agents of the criminal justice system to stop them. With this analysis, I hope to gain 
some insights as to what we can do to prevent chronic offending. 
Juvenile delinquency is very common. Adolescents commit a 
disproportionate amount of crime, including the more serious violent and property 
crime. In 1999, youth aged 13-17, who only account for about 6 percent of the 
general population, were involved in 16 percent of all Violent Crime Index arrests 
and 32 percent of all Property Crime Index arrests in the United States (OJJDP, 
2000). Aggregate data is fairly consistent in revealing an "age-crime curve"—crime 
rates rise sharply in teenage years, peak at about 16 to 18 years old, and then decline 
significantly with age (Moffitt, 1993; Sampson and Laub, 2001a). Youth cohort 
studies (Harrington and associate's Cambridge study and Wolfgang and associate's 
Philadelphia study, for instance) on crime persistence and recidivism tend to show 
that the probability of re-offending increases after each offense (Farrington, 1997). 
Thus, while research on youth crime validates public concern over it as a 
social problem, it also shows that the vast majority of teenagers stop committing 
illegal behavior after entering adulthood—they "age-out" of crime. After age cohorts 
reach adulthood, what is left is a small category of chronic offenders. Much of our 
"crime problem" may be attributed to this small category (Sampson and Laub, 
2001a). While life-course theory does well in explaining why most youth age-out of 
crime, it needs to be elaborated to explain why a small number of them persist. 
Explanations of aging-out quite often focus on how deviance may somehow be 
rewarding, temporarily, during adolescence, but punishing during adulthood. Most 
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teenagers engaging in delinquency remain relatively integrated in their communities, 
and once they "grow up," they have more to lose by engaging in behaviors that 
interfere with their abilities to extract resources from the community—through 
employment, higher education, marriage, etc. (Sampson and Laub, 2001a). Our 
criminal justice system was developed to discourage crime—to give individuals more 
to lose by engaging in crime. Thus, rationally speaking, we might expect all 
teenagers to eventually age-out of crime. Yet, a small number of youth offenders 
behave in a manner opposite to that intended by the criminal justice system—they 
persist with their offending. In this study, I employ life-course criminology and 
labeling theory to offer a possible explanation for this persistence. 
While labeling theory is not as popular as it once was, it has not been 
completely discredited as a way to understand how social processes lead to deviant 
behavior. However, there are at least three general problems with labeling theory. 
One problem is that the theory is often over-simplified and misunderstood. I begin 
this analysis by revisiting the major works popularly presented as "labeling theory," 
defending it at times while admitting weaknesses at others. A second problem, then, 
is that the theory does have weaknesses. Many of these weaknesses may be 
compensated for through integration with other theories. I then present more recent 
conceptualizations of labeling theory that strengthen it as a framework with which to 
study crime. A third problem is that labeling processes are often improperly studied 
in research. Analytical strategies involving the use of longitudinal data are more 
appropriate for testing propositions drawn from labeling theory. For the empirical 
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portion of this analysis, the relationship between deviant behavior and formal efforts 
to deter it is studied longitudinally, temporally arranged in a manner consistent with 
the predictions of labeling theory. Following the empirical analysis, I discuss the 
importance empirically supported labeling theory has for future theory and research, 
as well as its application in the treatment of youth offenders. 
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LABELING THEORY 
Overview of "Classic" Labeling Theory 
Labeling theory is used as a way to understand deviant behavior, including 
crime, as a consequence of social differentiation processes in which some of society's 
members are singled out, identified, and defined as deviant, while others are not 
(Traub and Little, 1994). Labeling theory was born out of a movement in the study of 
deviance to give more attention to societal reactions to deviance. Among others, John 
Kitsuse (1964: 87) proposed to "shift the focus of theory and research from the forms 
of deviant behavior to the processes by which persons come to be defined as deviant 
by others." According to Edwin Schur (1971: 7), "The central tenet of the labeling 
orientation is quite straightforward: Deviance and social control always involve 
processes of social definition." Individuals segregated as deviant are done so on the 
basis of their violation of social norms. As rule breakers, these individuals become, 
as Howard Becker (1973) stated, "outsiders" to mainstream members of society. 
The labeling perspective contains two general arguments regarding the 
creation of deviance. One is causal: interactions with agents and agencies of social 
control direct individuals toward deviant behavior, by affecting the development of 
deviant self-concepts for instance (Schur, 1971). The other argument is perhaps more 
iterative: deviant behaviors are deviant because individual and collective actors in 
society make rules against them (Schur, 1971). The processes involved in the 
creation of deviance operate at varying micro to macro levels. For instance, the 
development of deviant self-concepts takes place in interpersonal interaction, through 
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social psychological processes, while social definitions and rule making is often the 
result of organizational and societal behavior (Schur, 1971). 
The causal proposition of labeling theory is that the act of treating a person as 
a deviant, in itself, can lead to deviant behavior on the part of that person. The 
punishment of deviant behavior often has an ironic effect: efforts at social control 
lead to decreased control (Schur, 1971). Social definitions of deviance and their 
accompanying social sanctions somehow pressure labeled individuals into further 
deviant behaviors. Loosely speaking, a "label," or, a definition of a person as 
deviant, may be thought of as an independent variable, or, a cause of deviant behavior 
(Akers, 2000; Williams and McShane, 1994). The process by which a person is 
labeled as deviant may be summarized as follows. First, an act is deemed as deviant. 
Second, the person committing the act is deemed as deviant. And third, a moral 
condemnation is placed upon this person (Traub and Little, 1994). 
According to labeling theory, then, reactions to criminal behavior should be 
considered at least as important as the behavior itself, if not more. Labeling theory 
took a lesson from Kai Erikson (1964), who argued that the "social audience," not the 
individual, is the critical variable in studying deviance because it is the audience who 
decides which acts, or types of acts, deserve the deviant label. In their coverage of 
labeling theory, Traub and Little (1994: 290) wrote "it is the definition of an 
individual's behavior as deviant, rather than the behavior itself, that can cause a 
marked change in status which transforms a person's conception of self and initiates 
the process of locking that person into a 'deviant career'." Thus, we would expect a 
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"labeling theorist" to examine how the community behaves to control individuals that 
they view as undesirable—as deviant, as well as the outcomes of such social 
interaction. Labeling theorists may look at the effects of "defining" persons as 
"criminal," "delinquent," "bad kid," "mentally ill," "poor student," and so on by 
authority figures, such as the police, judges, teachers, parents, and psychiatrists, just 
to name just a few. 
Labeling theory may not explain well why people at first act in such a way to 
induce others to define them as deviant (the first time a child commits a delinquent 
act such as shoplifting, for example). It better explains deviant acts that take place 
after people have been labeled as deviant by authority figures. Thus, to understand 
how labeling processes end with deviant outcomes, it is important to know the 
relationship between "primary deviance" and "secondary deviance," as explained by 
Edwin Lemert (1994). Primary deviance refers to the initial deviant acts that people 
react to in defining someone as deviant. These acts can be attributed to many 
different causes but not labeling. It is the way that Iabelers treat the labeled after 
encountering their primary acts of deviance that constitute a traumatic event for the 
labeled and induces a personality change in the person defined as deviant. Secondary 
deviance refers to deviant acts that can be attributed to labeling. These subsequent 
acts of deviance may be seen as a defense or an attack launched by those labeled as 
deviant, who have developed an antagonistic relationship with mainstream society 
(Lemert, 1994). Secondary deviance may occur even if the primary accusation, or 
definition, of deviance is false (conversely, not everyone who commits deviant acts 
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will be labeled and treated as deviant). Thus, through the process in which we define, 
differentiate, and treat persons as deviant, primary deviance can lead to secondary 
deviance. Taken together, the two concepts specify a deviance amplification process. 
Becker (1973) helps us to understand how primary deviance may lead to 
secondary deviance through his discussion of the significance of deviance to social 
status. First, he applied the concept of master status traits, as popularized earlier by 
Everett C. Hughes. As a consequence of being caught and defined as deviant, a 
person undergoes a change in "public identity." The thing the person is accused of 
being is often represented with a term, such as "criminal," and the person caught and 
convicted of a crime acquires the social status of "criminal." Master status traits are 
used to primarily distinguish between those who belong in a status category and those 
who do not. In the case of the criminal, some kind of a "record" of the person's 
condemned behavior serves as the master status trait that warrants the person's status 
of "criminal" and denies her or him the status of "non-criminal." This is important 
remembering that labeling is a social differentiation process whereby some people are 
sorted out as deviant and others are sorted out as conforming. Further, certain 
"auxiliary traits" are also associated with certain statuses. Although these are not the 
traits that distinguish belonging, they are the ones we would expect people holding 
certain positions to have. In the case of the criminal, the public might expect her or 
him to also engage in other deviant behavior such as sexual promiscuity, substance 
abuse, and poor school or work performance. These expectations serve as the 
justification for further scrutiny of the labeled person's behavior by agents of social 
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control, increasing the salience of one's public identity as a deviant across social 
situations. 
Next, Becker (1973) focused attention on the deviant status itself by bringing 
in the concept of master status, also popularized by Hughes, as it applies to 
explaining deviant behavior. A master status has the most impact on a person's 
public identity and tends to override other statuses in determining how others will 
respond to her or him across social situations. For example, an employer may use a 
felony conviction record as a determinant in hiring a person more than that person's 
training or educational level—statuses that are in this case "subordinate statuses." 
Not only have persons labeled as criminal been granted a deviant status based on their 
presumed traits, but this status becomes the most important in determining their 
general social standing and public identity. Since there appears to be some evidence 
to others that the labeled person has broke rules, the person becomes publicly 
identified as the type of person who generally breaks rules. Becker (1973: 34) stated, 
"The deviant identification becomes the controlling one." 
Similarly, Erikson (1964) pointed out that the social selection process 
whereby the community decides whether or not to control an individual's behavior is 
a very intricate one. He argued that behavior condemned by the community is 
atypical of probably even prolific offenders. Any individual commits a wide variety 
of acts, and although greatly varied from person to person, the majority of these acts 
are bound to be conforming. When the community sanctions a person for a deviant 
act, it is reacting to one or a few acts from the person's behavioral repertoire. A 
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problem with social control, then, is that the community grants the master status of 
deviant to an individual on the basis of a flawed generalization of the individual's 
behavior. Based on a person's atypical behavior, s/he is seen to possess some general 
form of intra-personal pathology that warrants some kind of punishment and/or 
treatment, which may actually lead to undesirable outcomes. To put all of this in 
perspective, it might be said that the community has no more right to label a person 
who steals once or a few times a "criminal" than to label a person who fixes a car 
once or a few times a "mechanic." 
Erikson (1964) proposed that individuals undergo a three-phase ceremony to 
acquire a deviant status. First, based on the discovery of some behavior determined 
to be offensive, there is a confrontation between the alleged deviant person and 
community representatives—going to court or a psychiatric review for example. 
Second, community representatives announce some kind of judgement about the 
person and her or his behavior—a verdict or a diagnosis for example. Third, 
community representatives perform an act of placement—assigning the person 
special roles, such as "prisoner" or "patient." By assigning these roles, social control 
agencies redefine the person's position in society. The individual's experience in 
these phases is often quite public, such as the criminal trial, although not always as 
dramatic. A person defined and treated as deviant undergoes a type of ceremony in 
which her or his status is degraded. 
Becker (1973) explained that it is the granting of a deviant master status that 
has a stigmatizing and segregating effect upon persons labeled as deviant. When 
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others are aware of this status, they protect themselves from the person labeled as 
deviant by denying her or him opportunities to offend them. This necessarily 
involves a restriction from mainstream opportunities, such as school peer activities 
and employment, as well as any non-mainstream activities the labeled individual 
desires to engage in. Becker (1973) uses the example of the drug user. The deviant 
behavioral trait assumed of the person labeled a drug addict is generalized to other 
situations; others assume that the "type of person" to take drugs is also the "type of 
person" to do things like cheat at school or do a poor job at work. As a result, the 
drug user may be denied access to gainful employment, in addition to legitimate 
access to drugs. But, at this point, it is not the intrinsic qualities of a primary deviant 
act that prevents a person from engaging in mainstream activities—it is the social 
responses to that act that does. The fact that a person uses drugs may not itself render 
her or him incapable of performing well at work, it is the social restriction placed on 
the person by others in the community that does. Denied access to legitimate ways of 
making money to support a drug habit, the user may resort to illegal activities to do 
so—the secondary deviance in this case, which is not a direct result of taking drugs. 
Erikson (1964) also discussed the stigmatizing nature of the status degradation 
ceremony. He pointed out that this status change is almost irreversible; societal 
reactions to deviance typically do not involve an opposing "terminal ceremony" after 
the allotted time spent in deviant roles—one that would facilitate deviant role exit and 
a return to full citizen status. In other words, the sanctioned deviant is not allowed a 
status re-gradation ceremony. Idealistically, deviant roles are temporary, as a civil 
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society is expected to grant its rule violators chances to redeem themselves and return 
to the good graces of the community. Terminal ceremonies are in place for other 
temporary roles, however, such as the student whose role exit is marked by 
graduation. Without a public ceremony recognizing a sanctioned individual's return 
to mainstream social life—one that symbolically erases the public degradation 
ceremony—members of the community continue to believe that the individual 
possesses the deviant traits assumed to earn her or him the degraded status to begin 
with. Thus, the community refuses to grant the sanctioned person equal status; the 
deviant status becomes a fairly permanent one. For instance, police agencies 
typically scrutinize the behavior of ex-convicts more and will often turn to them first 
when searching for current crime suspects. After continued rejection by the 
community, sanctioned persons may even come to believe that their deviant roles are 
a stable reality for them, and resume deviant behavior (Erikson, 1964). 
Labeling theory put more focus on the already familiar argument that the 
institutions created to deter deviance might actually help perpetuate it. Prior to the 
theory's rise in popularity, it was widely proposed that institutions such as juvenile 
detentions, prisons, and residential mental health facilities gathered marginally 
deviant people into smaller, alienated group environments in which they could 
mutually learn and reinforce sustained deviant behaviors (Erikson, 1964). It is also a 
common argument that some of our social control institutions are quite weak and do 
not do a good job of stopping deviant behavior. According to Erikson (1964: 15), 
these institutions are so poorly equipped to deter deviance that we should wonder if 
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"this is considered their 'real' function at all." Perhaps Erikson is alluding here to 
some kind of latent function of deviance, ala Durkheim. If so, all the more reason to 
view social control and rule-making as entrepreneurial activity. The community may 
actually have a need for deviance to be sustained, for cohesion, norm clarification, 
and even to make life a little more interesting. Further, policing agencies need 
behavior to police, and deviants give them this—they provide social control agencies 
with a purpose in society. 
In addition to the causal argument, it is also important to understand the 
perspectives on deviance that labeling theory employs. First, labeling theory employs 
a "reactive" definition of deviance. Another major proposition of the theory is that 
behavior is deviant only because members of society designate it as deviant. In this 
way, it is, in a manner of speaking, society that creates deviance—through rule 
making and enforcing (Becker, 1973; Schur, 1971). The following statement by 
Erikson (1964: 11) expresses a position very popular in labeling theory: "Deviance is 
not a property inherent in certain forms of behavior; it is a property conferred upon 
these forms by the audiences which directly or indirectly witness them." The 
controversy here is that it appears that an "audience" is required for deviance to exist. 
A person who commits a potentially offensive act that either goes unnoticed or 
unsanctioned cannot be deviant, not sociologically anyway (Kitsuse, 1964). Thus, a 
label may also be seen as an outcome variable, or, a result of societal definition 
(Akers, 2000; Williams and McShane, 1994; Schur, 1971). Consistent with Erikson's 
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(1964) view of deviance, the following quote from Becker (1973: 9) illustrates this 
point well: 
...social groups create deviance by making the rides whose infraction 
constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and 
labeling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is not a quality 
of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by 
others of rules and sanctions to an "offender." The deviant is one to whom 
that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that 
people so label. 
To continue with the labeling perspective on deviance, it may be argued that 
the quality of deviant behavior emerges from interactions and exchanges between 
offending individuals and social control agents—it is the product of the relationship 
between person and social environment (Becker, 1973; Schur, 1971; Traub and Little, 
1994). Deviance, then, is a quality of interaction between "labelee" and "labeler." 
Further, labeling theory also holds the view that deviance is relative: whether an act is 
considered deviant or not depends on the situation, culture, historical period, and even 
who is committing the act. Even within a given population, it is rarely the case that a 
set of prescribed behaviors will be universally supported, practiced, and enforced 
(Kitsuse, 1964). Thus, labeling theory portrays deviance as a subjective social reality. 
A labeling theorist would consider how "rules" are made as well as the context in 
which they are made (Traub and Little, 1994). According to labeling theory, then, we 
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should not just believe that deviant behavior is the result of individuals' refusal or 
inability to obey certain objectively virtuous laws or rules (Schur, 1971). 
It is a common observation that many actions that cause serious harm to 
others receive little or no punishment, while seemingly harmless actions often receive 
severe punishment. Globally speaking, social entities can appear to be quite 
capricious in the way they construct and control deviance. Because of this, Kitsuse 
(1964) reasoned that it is not behavior itself that activates the social differentiation 
process that segregates deviants from non-deviants, and sociological definitions of 
deviance must incorporate the point of view of those who decide what and who is 
deviant. Accordingly, a major problem for deviance theory and research is knowing 
how groups, communities, or societies as wholes decide which behaviors are to be 
defined as deviant, and how they use these definitions to react to persons defined as 
deviant. Kitsuse (1964: 88) conceived of deviance as "a process by which the 
members of a group, community, or society (I) interpret behavior as deviant, (2) 
define persons who so behave as a certain kind of deviant, and (3) accord them the 
treatment considered appropriate to such deviants." This definition of deviance is 
quite consistent with a basic model of the labeling process. Kitsuse (1964: 97) also 
wrote, "it is the responses of the conventional and conforming members of the society 
who identify and interpret behavior as deviant which sociologically transforms 
persons into deviants." 
Becker (1973) spoke of deviance as an enterprise. Rules do not automatically 
arise from social need—they have to be created and then applied to people. He 
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referred to people who engage in this enterprise as "moral entrepreneurs" and 
identified two general types—"rule creators and rule enforcers." Rule creators are 
involved in making new rules. A popular variety consists of the reformer, who 
organizes moral crusades against types of behavior on behalf of humanity. Examples 
include the early twentieth century alcohol prohibitionists in the United States, or 
other prohibitionists objecting to gambling or certain sexual behaviors. Although 
crusaders may have altruistic intentions, they may also be quite self-righteous and 
have self-serving motives behind their campaigns. The ends sought by moral 
crusaders are usually some kind of formal legislation establishing rules against certain 
forms of behavior. For example, the moral crusade against alcohol led to the passage 
of the Eighteenth Amendment, which established Prohibition Laws. Once rules are 
created, rule enforcers are designated to identify and sanction persons who do not 
follow them. Rule enforcers often involve existing agencies, but new rules may 
require new enforcers. For example, after Prohibition Laws were passed, new police 
agencies were created to keep people from distributing and consuming alcohol, and to 
punish those who did. With the enterprise of deviance, it is moral entrepreneurs who 
determine the nature of deviance, not the behavior, itself, to which they object. 
Labeling theory may also be thought of as the symbolic interactionist 
perspective applied to deviance, especially with regard to Mead's ideas concerning 
the development of "self," and the self as a social process (Schur, 1971). The 
traditional version of labeling theory is often called the "self-concept approach." 
Self-concept refers to the sum of an individual's thoughts and feelings about her or 
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himself as an object (Rosenberg, 1992). Self-concepts are products of the reflexive 
self. Traditionally, labeling theory proposed that definitions of persons as deviant 
could become or at least strongly influence self-concepts. 
Deviance, including crime, is the product of interaction with others, whereby 
people learn and interpret the meaning of behavior, as well as reactions to it. Moral 
meanings attached to behaviors are socially constructed over time through social 
interaction. Also, one's perceptions of oneself is constructed through social 
interaction—who we think we are depends largely on how others treat us. A "label" 
is symbolic of the person, and its meaning is interpreted and used to shape social 
interaction. De-valued labels contribute to unfavorable definitions of the person. 
Children form their self-concepts reflexively, through interaction with significant 
others; by learning how others see them, children find a source of information as to 
who they are. If significant others define and treat them as deviant, children may 
come to see themselves as deviant. The child's self-appraisal as somehow 
undesirable is actually a reflected appraisal based on the child's interpretation of 
others' actions toward her or him. Further, a person's behavior may be seen as 
largely the result of self-concepts and self-attitudes. For example, if a child is 
repeatedly called a "bad kid" by a parent, the child may come to perceive her/himself 
as a bad kid and misbehave. Seen this way, labeling processes involve Cooley's 
notion of "the looking glass self' in action. 
According to labeling theory, the treatment of individuals as deviant has a 
"stigmatizing" effect on a person defined as deviant, to the point of altering her or his 
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sense of self (Traub and Little, 1994). An indication of moral condemnation is placed 
upon a person for committing a deviant act—the person becomes "branded," if you 
will, which may actually involve the stereotyping of offenders. After being put 
through a degradation ceremony, the person realizes that s/he now has diminished 
status. According to Tannenbaum (1994), children labeled as deviant come to realize 
that they are defined as a different kind of person than their "non-deviant" peers. He 
wrote, "This recognition on his part becomes a process of self-identification and 
integration with the group which shares his activities" (293). The child defined as 
deviant, then, comes to identify with others labeled as deviant. Tannenbaum (1994: 
296) wrote further, "The person becomes the thing he is described as being." 
Conceptualized this way, an act of labeling can have profound immediate effects on a 
person's sense of self and behavior. 
However, Tannenbaum (1994) also discussed the ongoing conflict that exists 
between children labeled as deviant and those who define and react to them as 
deviant. As a reaction to being treated as undesirable, these children begin to develop 
an antagonistic attitude toward socially expected and/or approved behavioral 
expressions and come to view them as insufficient for meeting their needs. They then 
do not conform to the behavioral patterns adults attempt to impose upon them. Not 
fitting into established social institutions, these children look to alternative 
institutions, possibly those involving illegal behaviors, to fulfill their wishes. Thus, it 
is the treatment of children as deviant that can "push" them toward delinquency. 
Here, Tannenbaum leaves the door open to talk about the role of prolonged 
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interaction between labeler and "labelee" in promoting deviant behavior instead of 
just focusing on the immediate impact of labeling on self-development. Once 
children treated as deviant reject mainstream institutions and accept illegal ones, and 
identify with criminally defined social groups and categories, they may actually come 
to expect (and perhaps even desire) messages from significant others and 
representatives of mainstream institutions that they are not part of mainstream 
society. 
As Becker (1973) and Erikson (1964) mentioned, labeling deviant behavior 
involves what Merton (1957) called the "self-fulfilling prophecy," a concept useful in 
understanding many social processes. The self-fulfilling prophecy refers to 
perceptions or judgments that are validated only because people believe them to be 
true and subsequently behave in ways that make them come true. Usually, when we 
initiate self-fulfilling prophecies, we likely do so unintentionally—we do not realize 
that we are the ones bringing about our own predictions. Merton tells us that the self-
fulfilling prophecy is part of what W. I. Thomas referred to as the "definition of the 
situation." The "Thomas Theorem" simply states, "If men define situations as real, 
they are real in their consequences" (quoted in Merton, 1957: 475). The predictions 
made in self-fulfilling prophecies are "definitions of a situation" that "become an 
integral part of the situation and thus affect subsequent developments" (Merton, 1957: 
477). The self-fulfilling prophecy is often, initially, a "false definition of the 
situation." After this false definition is conceived, it is the behavior of its perpetrator 
that makes it come true. Because the false definition eventually becomes true, the 
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perpetrator of the self-fulfilling prophecy can point to the outcome as proof of the 
legitimacy of the initial definition, creating a "reign of errors." (In other words, we 
can make claims that are not true but behave in ways that make them come true, and 
then proclaim that we originally claimed correctly.) 
Finally, it is important to recognize the contingencies evident in labeling 
processes. Kitsuse (1964: 101) pointed out that the process of differentiating people 
into deviants and non-deviants depend on "circumstances of the situation, place, 
social and personal biography, and the bureaucratically organized activities of 
agencies of control." To begin, social status is one important contingency. 
Social conflict theory also deserves some credit for contributing to labeling 
theory. Although not always recognized, power is a critical building block in labeling 
theory. It is the powerful—those with high social status—who make and enforce the 
rules used as standards in judging persons as deviant (Becker, 1973). It is likely that 
the powerful in society engage in the enterprise of deviance in such a way as to 
protect mainstream social arrangements and aspirations. Thus, it is important to 
recognize that labeling processes are contingent upon social statuses such as class, 
race, ethnicity, sex/gender, and age. We should not expect them to occur in the same 
way across different social groups and categories. It is the less powerful who stand a 
greater chance of being defined and treated as deviant, due to increased exposure and 
vulnerability to sanctioning agents (Becker, 1973). The pressure toward conformity 
is more easily placed on those who lack the resources to resist this pressure, and it is 
the powerful that determine which acts are deviant, which are not, and the 
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punishment for non-conformity. For the most part, it is the powerful that label, and it 
is the less powerful who get labeled. For example, some research suggests that lower 
SES youth are more susceptible to labeling processes than higher SES youth 
(Matsueda, 1992; Sampson, 1986; Sampson and Laub, 1997). That is, defining 
children as deviant may promote further deviance on their part for lower-class 
children, but it may actually deter further deviance on the part of higher-class children 
(eventually), possibly because higher social and economic resources buffer the 
stigmatizing and segregating effects of labeling. 
We might expect a similar case with race and ethnicity—that racial and ethnic 
minorities will be more exposed and vulnerable to being labeled as deviant, while less 
likely to be the ones doing the defining and sanctioning (Fishman, 1998). On the 
structural level we know that in the United States, racial and ethnic minorities are 
over-represented in lower SES categories, granting them less social and economic 
power than the white majority. It is the dominant white majority that has the greater 
hand in determining what and who is to be defined as deviant as well as what the 
proper sanctions should be (Fishman, 1998), largely based on Western, capitalist, 
Judeo-Christian values. Socio-economic disadvantages mean that minorities have 
less power to hide their behavior from social control agencies. For example, the 
police typically patrol poor neighborhoods with large concentrations of minorities, to 
look for "street crime" (Fishman, 1998; Portillos, 1998), but not many patrol plush 
office buildings looking for "white collar crime." Socio-economic disadvantages also 
mean that minorities are less able to resist labels once authorities attempt to apply 
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them. For instance, poorer defendants in court do not have the amount of money 
needed to purchase a strong defense, or, "get them off." Further, labeling on the basis 
of race and ethnicity is built into institutional practices—a good example being racial 
profiling. Racial profiling illustrates the self-fulfilling prophecy quite thoroughly. 
Racial bias means that police target racial minorities more when attempting to expose 
crime. Since they target the minorities more, they catch more minorities. Criminal 
composites are formed on the basis of who has been arrested the most in the past; not 
who actually commits the most crime. Armed with the resulting profile, the police 
target minorities, and so on. 
On the interpersonal level, commonly held prejudices and stereotypes get 
located in the cognitive structures of individuals serving as social control authorities 
(Portillos, 1998). In a racially and ethnically prejudiced society, the schematic 
version of "the deviant," notably "the criminal," is all too often a minority (Fishman, 
1998; Rodriguez, 1998). For example, to see how often African-American and 
Latino/a-American are used to provide the schema of the "criminal," one only need to 
look at popular images portrayed in television and movies (Berg, 1997; Castro, 1998; 
Lichter and Amundsen, 1997; Rodriguez, 1997). When enfranchised Americans 
think of what kind of person would hurt them, they may be more likely to think of a 
racial or ethnic minority. Individuals holding authority such as the police, judges, 
teachers, counselors, etc. are also part of the communities wherein derogatory social 
attitudes lie, and they are all capable of using racial and ethnic stereotypes to increase 
their tendency to label minorities more often than whites. A popular complaint 
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among African Americans is that the police frequently pull them over in automobiles 
without probable cause, a pattern likely due to such a tendency (Fishman, 1998). 
A class interaction with labeling may have been demonstrated in William 
Chambliss' well-known case study of "The Saints and the Roughnecks" (Chambliss, 
2000). The Saints were a group of white upper-middle-class high school boys who 
did fairly well in school and got in virtually no trouble with the law. The Roughnecks 
were a group of white lower-class boys at the same high school. They did not do as 
well in school and got into a great deal of trouble with the law. However, per 
Chambliss' observations, both groups engaged in about the same rate and seriousness 
of delinquency. The local police, as well as the community in general, saw the Saints 
as "good boys," which may have led to the boys' avoidance of arrest. On the other 
hand, the community, especially the local police, saw the Roughnecks as 
troublemakers—as evidenced by their prior contact with the Roughnecks. The 
difference in social definitions of the Saints versus the Roughnecks was largely due to 
"selective perception and labeling." It was apparent that the police scrutinized the 
behavior of the Roughnecks more than the Saints, based on their contrasting 
definitions of the two groups. This likely led to the Roughnecks getting caught and 
punished a great deal more than the Saints. Further, the Saints' ability to avoid the 
deviant label may have in some ways facilitated their delinquent behavior. The bias 
the police had in favor of the Saints and against the Roughnecks could be one of 
class—the police were of the same socio-economic status as the families of the 
Saints. Also, being lower class meant that the Roughnecks were more "visible." 
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They lacked transportation resources and were less able to make it to the edge of 
town where deviant behavior could be hidden. 
After high school, most of the Saints went to college and acquired good 
careers. Only two of the Roughnecks acquired gainful careers, and at least three of 
the boys graduated into chronic and/or serious crime. Social class affected the 
experiences with social control agencies of both the Saints and the Roughnecks while 
they were growing up. Chambliss (2000) believed that through interaction with 
others in the community, the Roughnecks acquired images of themselves as deviants 
and chose to associate with others like them. Through the way the community 
defined and reacted to the boys over time, and through exchanges within their deviant 
groups, the developing deviant self-images of the Roughnecks were continually 
reinforced. As the deviant self-identity got stronger, they became more willing to try 
new and more serious forms of deviant behavior, putting them at greater risk of 
getting stuck on a path toward deviant careers. For the Saints, on the other hand, 
class advantages meant that their interaction with the mainstream community would 
lead to the development and reinforcement of non-deviant identities (the Saints did 
not even define their delinquent behavior as deviant) and opportunities for long-term 
community integration and socially desirable careers. 
Additionally, the likelihood that one will be defined and treated as deviant 
depends on the status of the person(s) being offended (Becker, 1973). High status 
persons possess social resources that may be used to inflict serious sanctions upon 
those who offend them, whereas lower status persons may not be able to be as 
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punishing toward their offenders, especially when their offenders are of higher status. 
For example, an employer who discovers that an employee is stealing at the 
workplace is able to convince others that the employee is deviant and go so far as to 
fire the employee. On the other hand, an employee who discovers that an employer 
has, say, violated workplace safety laws would have great difficulty in establishing a 
widely held definition of the employer as deviant or removing the employer from her 
or his position. Thus, the stickiness of a label is the result of a status interaction 
between the person doing an act and the person(s) judging the act. 
Being labeled as deviant is also dependent upon factors other than social 
status. As Palamara, Cullen, and Gerstein (1986) suggest, the effects of labeling on 
future deviance may depend on the type of deviance as well as the type of societal 
reaction to it. For instance, we might expect certain crimes to draw more profound 
societal reactions than others might. Marijuana use in the United States, for example, 
is condemned more than alcohol use, especially through law, and neither is as "bad" 
as physical assault. At the same time, certain societal reactions have more powerful 
stigmatizing and segregating effects than others might—incarceration over probation 
for example. Becker (1973) mentioned that labeling depends on the timing of an act. 
For example, formal sanctions and public condemnation against drug use is likely to 
be more harsh during periods in which politicians declare a "war on drugs," as 
compared to periods with more liberal political climates. Becker (1973) also 
mentioned that labeling depends on the consequences of an act. For example, the 
drunk driver who causes an accident harming someone may be seen as more 
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"deviant," and will certainly receive stiffer penalties, than the drunk driver who only 
gets pulled over by the police. 
Erikson (1964) also argued that the "sorting"' of persons into deviant versus 
non-deviant social categories often depend on many factors having nothing to do with 
the deviant act in and of itself (which may be less true for serious crimes such as 
murder). In addition to social class, these factors may include offending record, 
degree of offender remorse, and the changing temperament of the community. These 
factors may explain, for instance, why some people who drink too much are labeled 
"alcoholics," while others are not. Noting the expansive criteria by which the 
community judges its members as deviant returns us to the reason why some 
sociologists of deviance during the 1960s called for an accounting of the audience in 
identifying the nature of deviance. Erikson (1964: 12) wrote: 
... the difference between those who earn a deviant label and those who go 
their own way in peace depends almost entirely on the way in which the 
community sifts out and codes the many details of behavior to which it is 
witness. In this respect, the community screen may be a more relevant subject 
for sociological research than the actual behavior which is filtered through it. 
From this standpoint, it is important to understand how a community decides what 
and who is deviant or not, and we cannot assume thait the community administers 
social control simply to protect itself from objectively harmful effects of deviance. 
Figure 1 depicts a conceptual model that summarizes the general argument of 
the traditional self-concept approach to labeling theory. 
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Figure 1. A self-concept model of labeling theory 
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A Critique and Defense of Labeling Theory 
Labeling theory has endured its share of criticism, with much of it warranted. 
Conceptual analyses by critics have revealed theoretical "holes" in labeling's 
explanatory reasoning, and hypotheses developed from the framework have 
traditionally been difficult to support. Thus, by the early 1970s, labeling theory had 
become unpopular (Goode, 1975). However, much of the decline in the theory's 
popularity may be due to misunderstandings, over-simplifications, and unfair 
criticisms surrounding the theory (Schur, 1971). 
One of the problems with labeling theory may be that it is not a distinct, 
unified "field," containing theorists and researchers who may be neatly "labeled," if 
you will, "labeling theorists." Goode (1975) pointed out that much of the classic 
work on "labeling theory" was done by writers whose work was not done primarily in 
labeling, and whose work often stands in opposition to each other or principles 
popularly believed to be an integral part of labeling theory. Goode called into 
question the work of four theorists often cited as labeling theorists: Edwin Lemert, 
Kai Erikson, John FCitsuse, and Howard Becker. Per Goode's argument, Lemert 
referred to "objective" qualities of deviance, Erikson's work in general was more 
functionalist, Kitsuse wrote critiques of labeling theory, and Becker believes that 
labeling is not even a theory, per se. Consequently, it is difficult to identify a unified 
body of work that we may designate collectively as "labeling theory," and it may 
even be argued that labeling theory does not exist outside of popular characterizations 
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of it (Goode, 1975). Without a clear, complete statement of labeling theory, it can be 
confusing and it is more vulnerable to "straw man" attacks against it. 
However, even if it is true that labeling theory is not a well-defined body of 
work, this does not mean that we cannot utilize and refine labeling as a wider 
perspective or theoretical framework, and at least develop a clearer idea of what we 
mean by "labeling theory." Further, we should not be uncomfortable with a lack of a 
unified school of labeling theorists who work primarily in labeling theory. If we can 
be convinced of the value of integrated theory and research, we should not have to see 
a need for a body of work that can strictly be considered labeling theory. Rather, 
what is important is that we develop a useful labeling framework containing a system 
of conceptual tools that can be used to construct empirically verifiable theoretical 
explanations of crime or other deviant behavior. Thus, it is okay if theorists who 
work primarily in other areas "dabble" in labeling theory, as long as they produce 
informative work. Apparently, later writers took the work of deviance scholars such 
as Becker, Lemert, Erikson, and Kitususe and turned it into a "theory" that these 
scholars did not intend. This is a risky venture, but one that does not necessarily 
discount the unintended theory. Although it is preferable that most theory is not 
constructed this way, a practical argument would be that the true value of a theory lies 
in how much it can explain more than the way it was constructed. A favorable slant 
can be placed on the way labeling theory was "concocted." It is a very interesting, 
and hopefully useful, piecing together of bits of work on deviance. It may be that 
labeling theory is one of the most wonderful "accidents" in sociological theory. 
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Another problem is that many times, labeling "works." The theory is difficult 
to reconcile with empirical observations thsat defining and treating an individual as 
deviant reduce continued deviant behavior (Goode, 1975; Mankoff, 1999). By being 
stigmatized, a person may feel guilty about, committing a certain act and be compelled 
to avoid doing it again. The person may even engage in more pro-social behavior to 
"get back in the good graces" of those one lias relationships with. This apparent clash 
is actually easily resolved, remembering that labeling is not just a social 
psychological process but also a social structural one. According to the theory, 
labeling is a social differentiation process. It recognizes that some people in a society 
are defined as deviant while others are not, often regardless of the actual behaviors 
they perform. Whether one is defined as deviant or not may depend more on one's 
relative power than actual behavior. Individuals with a good deal of power are more 
resistant, and perhaps exposed less, to the segregating effects of being labeled, while 
they have more to lose by continuing deviant behavior. It is the powerful that do the 
labeling, which makes it less likely that the^ will be labeled. On the other hand, 
individuals with little power are not only tarrgeted more, but they have less 
psychosocial resources in which to ward offf labels, and they enjoy less social 
privileges. Thus, there is an interaction here with regard to successful social control 
via labeling. Stigmatization may "work" om higher status, well-integrated persons but 
"not work" on very low status, disenfranchised persons. 
Problems with labeling theory also srtem from the definition of deviance it 
employs (Schur, 1971). Claiming that deviaence is relative, reactive, and interactive 
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opens the door to a quite broad definition of deviance. At times, labeling definitions 
of deviance appear "foggy." It is, of course, important to use clear, practical 
definitions of phenomena explored in scientific inquiry. In response, Schur (1971: 
24) offered the following "working definition of deviance": 
Human behavior is deviant to the extent that it comes to be viewed as 
involving a personally discreditable departure from a group's normative 
expectations, and it elicits interpersonal or collective reactions that serve to 
'isolate,' 'treat,' 'correct,' or 'punish' individuals engaged in such behavior. 
This definition is a useful guide to operationalizing deviant behavior in research 
because it specifies, albeit abstractly, the behaviors to be included as deviant 
phenomena as well as the conditions under which they occur. Also, the definition is 
flexible enough to view deviance as a "sensitizing concept" (Schur, 1971). 
Since the theory employs a relativistic, reactive definition of deviance, it is 
limited in explaining any crime that appears to have at least some absolute qualities 
(Goode, 1975; Mankoff, 1999). Many criminal acts are tangibly injurious, such as 
murder, physical assault, and item theft. Arguably, just about any criminal act is 
bound to have at least a small element of objective harm about it. But, an important 
part of labeling theory is that it posits that behavior can only be established as deviant 
through societal reactions to it. In other words, the only thing that makes behavior 
deviant is the label placed upon it. It is very difficult to argue that all deviance is 
merely a matter of interpretation on the part of the "labeler." Further, a reactive 
definition of deviance makes it more difficult to distinguish between deviance and 
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non-deviance, or between "deviants" and "non-deviants" (Gibbs, 1966). For 
example, if deviance is created only by societal reaction, then thieves who do not get 
caught cannot be deviant, while persons falsely accused of stealing are deviant. 
In an article first printed in 1971, Mankoff (1999) argued that societal reaction 
theory does not explain all forms of career rule-breaking. Specifically, he argued that 
the theory may help explain "ascribed rule-breaking" but not "achieved rule-
breaking." Ascribed rule-breaking occurs when the labeled person does not commit 
an act that leads to being labeled; the person is labeled on the basis of her or his 
physical characteristics such as height, handicap, sex, race, and attractiveness. Here, 
consistent with labeling theory, the only way individuals may be considered "deviant" 
is if the community so labels them—this label is completely independent from the 
individual's behavior. Thus, societal reaction is a necessary condition for career 
ascribed deviance. However, since stigmatized persons may have the status, power, 
and skill to ward off social definitions of them as deviant, societal reaction is not 
quite a sufficient condition for career ascribed deviance. Achieved rule-breaking, on 
the other hand, occurs when a person acts in such a way to receive a label—stealing 
for example. Here, if an act is required to receive a label, then societal reaction is not 
a necessary condition for career achieved deviance, which is contrary to labeling 
theory. Mankoff (1999) pointed out that even Becker did not include societal reaction 
in his model outlining the progression from a beginning marijuana user (as a case of 
primary deviance) to a regular marijuana user (as a case of secondary deviance). 
Further, since early research did not support hypotheses of the exacerbating effects of 
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formal sanctions, it did not appear that societal reaction is a sufficient condition for 
career achieved deviance either. Thus, Mankoff (1999) concluded that societal 
reaction theory is not an adequate general theory of deviance. It is fair to admit that 
labeling theory lends itself to explaining certain forms of deviant behavior better than 
others might (Schur, 1971). 
It would be easy here to "cop-out" and just admit that labeling theory cannot 
explain all crime, but perhaps reconciliation should be made here also. Edwin Schur 
(1971) cleared up some of the misunderstandings of labeling theory. To begin, he 
pointed out that an extreme relativistic definition of deviance is not the cornerstone of 
labeling theory. An important tenet of labeling theory is not that deviance is only "in 
the eye of the beholder," but that the nature of an individual's offensive behavior is 
not independent from social definition. Thus, it should be understood that a strict 
focus on "the labeler" is contradictory to what the labeling theorist desires. Rather, 
the labeling theorist is interested in the entire social context of offensive behavior 
(Schur, 1971). It is a better representation of labeling theory to present an 
"interactionist" definition of deviance as one of its primary features. With this in 
mind, even an act with objective properties, such as murder, is available for 
subjective interpretation. For instance, our willingness to label an individual who 
kills someone as a "murderer" as opposed to, say, one who was acting in self-defense 
(or is even "innocent") may depend on her or his social status and power. Further, 
even if crime may have objective qualities, perhaps the most important point made in 
labeling theory—that reactions to deviance may promote further deviance—is not 
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discounted. A case in point, an individual sanctioned for committing violent acts may 
still become more prone to committing violent acts, despite the relativistic versus 
absolute nature of physical violence. Perhaps, then, the extent to which societal 
reaction to behavior defines the social nature of the behavior varies from act to act. 
For instance, the representation of marijuana use as socially harmful may be almost 
completely constructed through social reaction, whereas the representation of murder 
as harmful is largely not. Additionally, it would be wise to avoid dichotomizing 
between "deviants" and non-deviant." Persons may be relatively deviant or 
conforming, as the standards used to establish the deviance vary in their degree of 
severity as well as the circumstances under which they apply (Schur, 1971). 
A similar problem is that since labeling theory puts a great deal of focus on 
the behavior of those who label, it may not pay enough attention to the behavior of 
those who get labeled (Akers, 2000). It is difficult for the theory to account for 
agency on the part of the actor defined and treated as deviant, or the motivation of the 
actor to commit the behavior (Gibbs, 1966). Labeling theory does hold that the 
labeler determines whether or not an act becomes labeled as deviant, not the act itself. 
However, although there are certainly many instances of erroneous and unjust labels 
placed upon people, it is not likely that agents of social control label people 
haphazardly (Akers, 2000). In most cases, it is probably understandable that a person 
is labeled as deviant and sanctioned per her or his behavior. For example, it would be 
difficult to argue that individuals who commit armed robbery have given the criminal 
justice system no cause to label and punish them. Wouldn't we expect actual illegal 
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behavior to still be the largest predictor of whether or not a person gets involved with 
the criminal justice system? It seems reasonable to hold labeled persons at least 
partly responsible for the labels they receive, in many cases. Also, it is warranted that 
labeling theory incorporate human agency more in portraying how labels are applied. 
Arguments as to how much responsibility we attribute to individuals' behavior 
for their own labels will vary, of course. For example, Akers (2000: 127) teaches, 
"The behavior creates the label more than the label creates the behavior, and 
subsequent deviant behavior continues the label more than the label continues the 
behavior." Is this always true? What about cases involving false or unwarranted 
labels? For example, is it universally accepted that marijuana use warrants the label 
of "criminal" placed upon the regular marijuana user, while the same label is not 
placed upon the regular alcohol user? Further, can't the "subsequent deviant 
behavior" that "continues the label" be due to a prior label, as labeling theory would 
predict? Akers' statement begs for much empirical verification. Even if it turns out 
to be true, labeling theory will still be useful as long as we can show that sanctions 
can promote future deviance. Again, an important proposition of labeling theory has 
not been confronted here. Even if an individual's behavior is completely to blame for 
receiving a label as deviant, it does not mean that the label and accompanying 
sanctions will not lead to more deviance on the part of the individual. We live in a 
world that has a great deal of unfairness, and labeling theory is still important in that 
it explains some of that unfairness. 
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Although labeling theory carries an admission that the label does not cause the 
deviant behavior initially, with the distinction between primary and secondary 
deviance, the theory tended to disregard factors that may explain initial deviant 
behavior after a person has been labeled. Once behavior may be conceived as 
secondary deviance, it would be a mistake to assume that factors other than labeling— 
such as socio-economic status, parental supervision, community disorganization, and 
psychopathology, to name a few—have nothing to do with continued deviant behavior 
(Akers, 2000). It is not necessary that labeled persons commit all of their deviant acts 
because they are labeled, and it is certainly possible for individuals to continue 
deviant behavior without it being known to or sanctioned by others. Deviant 
behavior, like any social behavior, is multi-causal. To confront this weakness in 
labeling theory, it must be integrated conceptually and in research with other theories. 
This it quite possible in that labeling is actually complimentary to other theoretical 
perspectives, as I will elaborate later. Schur (1971: 29) stated early, "In general, the 
labeling approach should not, and indeed cannot be seen in terms of labeling alone." 
Although labeling theory's weaknesses must be acknowledged, and we should 
work to improve it, much of the criticism launched against it may be unfair. In 
somewhat of a defense of labeling theory, Erich Goode (1975) charged that critiques 
of labeling often shared three flaws. First, critics appeared bent on discrediting it 
instead of criticizing it constructively. Second, labeling arguments have been 
misrepresented. Third, specific writings on labeling theory have been attacked rather 
than considering its worth as a wider perspective. One of the problems with labeling 
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theory is that it is often portrayed in an over-simplified manner, and some of its critics 
have been accused of launching "straw man" arguments against it (Goode, 1975). 
In this section, the specific criticisms against labeling theory are itemized. 
Looking at each criticism, it appears that many labeling critics focus on one particular 
argument in labeling theory, claim it as the central argument of the theory, and then 
"bum it down." Really, labeling theory contains many important arguments: labeling 
causes deviant behavior, labeling is the result of societal reaction, deviance is relative 
and created by the societal reaction, labeling affects one's self-concept, and labeling 
is also a social structural differentiation process. Which one of these arguments is 
central to labeling appears to be quite subjective; the literature contains no consensus 
as to what the main point made in labeling theory (which does create problems). 
Personally, I find the proposition that labeling is a cause of deviant behavior to be 
central because it is pertinent to the etiology of crime, and it suggests a way to go 
about reducing crime. However, I do not have an argument as to why others should 
accept this. Perhaps the most appreciative way to present labeling theory is as a wide 
theoretical framework containing several important arguments as to the causes and 
nature of deviant behavior. To dismiss labeling as a theoretical framework, at least 
most of its collection of arguments has to be completely dismissed. In many of the 
labeling critiques, an admission is made that "central" propositions in labeling theory 
may at times be true. 
Goode (1975) defended labeling theory against some specific criticisms. For 
instance, labeling theory has traditionally been used to explain a somewhat narrow 
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range of morally reprehensible deviant behavior committed by the less powerful—the 
behavior of "nuts, sluts, and perverts." Also, labeling theory has been accused of 
narrowly focusing on social psychological processes and ignoring structural causes of 
deviance (Gibbs, 1966). Quite often, in the literature, the approach does seem to 
ignore the part that powerful segments of society play in creating and sustaining 
deviant behavior (including their own). However, as Goode points out, this problem 
with labeling theory lies within how it has been used and is not inherent in the nature 
of the tool itself. Perhaps labeling theory's relationship with the conflict perspective 
should be more recognized. For instance, we can attempt to explain why persons 
committing certain "damaging" acts get labeled as deviant and become segregated 
while others do not, even if they are committing the same kind of deviance. It is 
already suspected that poorer people and minorities are more likely to be labeled and 
treated as deviant. The differing incidence of deviant behavior across segments of the 
population may be partially explained by the proposition that societal reactions to 
deviance differ across social categories and institutional settings. As Schur (1971) 
pointed out, labeling processes operate at several levels, so to accuse labeling theory 
of only proposing that deviant outcomes is produced at one level is unfair. 
Of the earlier so-called "labeling theorists," the one we may be able to rightly 
refer to as such is Edwin Schur. Schur (1971) took the fragmented propositions of 
labeling theory and organized them into a coherent set of explanations. He mentioned 
two basic deviant outcomes of the interplay between social process and societal level. 
First, with regard to labeled individuals, they settle into the role most available to 
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them—a deviant role. As such, they become more locked into deviant careers. 
Second, with regard to society as a whole, the secondary deviance produced through 
societal reaction expands its "deviance problems" (adding to a "crime problem" for 
instance). These are the outcomes proposed by most, if not all, labeling theory. What 
makes Schur's labeling theory more defendable against critics is his mutli-level view 
of labeling processes, as well as his explanation of how these processes work. 
According to Schur's (1971), labeling processes operate at three social levels. 
One level is "collective rule-making." "Rules" are closely tied with beliefs and 
values widely held among people who make up a society, or a segment of society. 
On a more macro-social level, rule-making, as well as rule-enforcing, result from 
collective action such as moral crusades, which may involve social conflict between 
segments of society. A second level is "organizational processing." Social 
organizations engage in social control, formally and informally, and as such, play a 
part in producing deviance. A third level is "interpersonal reactions." As a symbolic 
interactionist perspective on labeling teaches, deviant identity formation, 
stigmatization, and segregation take place when individuals and small groups react to 
persons labeled as deviant. 
Also according to Schur (1971), labeling involves three "basic response 
processes" operating across the three levels. One is stereotyping. To a great extent, 
to label someone is to stereotype someone. On the collective rule-making level, 
members of the general public share attitudes and beliefs about the stereotypical 
attributes of the "deviant." An example is the way stereotypes of criminals are 
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presented in the mass media. On the organizational level, "profiles" and other 
typifications are used to "process" constituents, according to their normal or abnormal 
status. An example is the processing of criminal offenders through the legal system, 
or the preference of employers to hire non-offenders. On the interpersonal level, 
individuals use stereotypes as information telling them what the person labeled as 
deviant is like and how to respond to her or him in interaction, as when members of 
the community tend to avoid contact with offenders. 
Another process is "retrospective interpretation," which involves a retroactive 
cognitive restructuring of the past behavior of a person "discovered" to be deviant 
(Schur, 1971). On the collective rule-making level, categories of persons may be 
"seen in a new light" contingent upon changes in the political climate, as when the 
drug user becomes demonized during a "war on drugs." On the organizational level, 
recorded "histories" of constituents are used to determine present and future statuses 
with the organization, as when adjudicators and mental health professionals use "case 
histories" to assess the extent of a person's criminality or mental health problems. On 
the interpersonal level, after individuals learn about a person's label, they tend to 
believe that the person has been qualitatively deviant all along. For example, mere 
"hanging out" may be reinterpreted as "looking for trouble" after a neighbor 
discovers that a teenager has been in trouble with the law. 
A third process is negotiation. The degree to which one is considered deviant 
and punished depends on power exchanges involving "bargaining" (Schur, 1971). 
Those with more power resist labels better. On the collective rule-making level, 
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different collectivities compete and compromise to institutionalize their definitions of 
deviance, as when political movements lead to changes in law. On the organizational 
processing level, constituents bargain with their organizations to determine relative 
deviant or non-deviant statuses—plea bargaining in court for example. On the 
interpersonal level, labeler and Iabelee bargain over the label, as when a psychiatrist 
diagnoses a patient. 
Goode (1975) also defended labeling theory against the false accusation that 
labeling theorists assume that there is "value consensus" in society among both 
"deviants" and "conformists." Labeling theory may hold the assumption that persons 
committing deviant acts are aware of conformist values and may even be concerned 
with the consequences of their deviant acts (including others' reactions to them). 
However, the theory also allows for the recognition that these persons often do not 
share normative values or even care about public condemnation for violating them. 
Further, many persons committing acts considered to be deviant do not have their 
behavior exposed to the public and thus escape "public labeling" (although one may 
experience the effects of labeling through a more private identification with a publicly 
stigmatized social category or group). 
Goode (1975) goes a long way in "saving" labeling theory but does so at a 
cost that those of use wishing to use it may not be willing to pay. He made a few 
significant concluding statements, including "Labeling theory isn't a theory at all" 
(1975: 581). Given the lack of defining boundaries on what is and is not labeling 
theory, he is probably correct in stating that labeling is not a theory. But, Goode went 
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on to state, "Perhaps it isn't even as grandiose an edifice as a general perspective" 
(1975: 581). Is this way of looking at labeling theory a "cop-out"? Is Goode making 
labeling theory easier to defend by watering it down to some vague paradigm? He 
drew from Blumer in claiming that the ideas of labeling theory exist at the level of 
"sensitizing concepts," which by no means serves as a demotion for labeling theory, 
but would be incomplete if labeling theory can prove to provide operational 
definitions of causal variables. Goode appears to believe that using labeling theory to 
search for causes of deviant behavior would be a waste of time. He continued, "The 
question of etiology... may very well be beyond the scope of labeling theory; it was 
never intended to be an explanation of causality" and "... no one would hold that 
labeling creates a given form of behavior de novo" (1975: 582). 
Becker (1973) added a chapter titled, "Labelling Theory Reconsidered" to his 
revised version of Outsiders. In it, he asserted that the statements on deviance he and 
the other theorists originally credited for labeling theory should never have been 
considered explicit theories—they were not statements directly addressing the 
etiology of crime. Rather, they were just a way to broaden an understanding of 
deviance through a consideration of the behavior of others surrounding the rule-
breaking actor. He went so far as to reject the expression, "labelling theory," and 
instead referred to the work this term represents as "interactionist theory." Becker 
(1973) admitted that the actions of "moral entrepreneurs" couldn't, by themselves, 
explain why people commit deviant acts. It would be foolish to say, for instance, that 
a robber robs simply because someone labeled him/her a "robber." We cannot ignore 
43 
the fact that one of the forefathers of labeling theory, so to speak, has refuted popular 
interpretations of it. However, Becker (1973) did hold a place for "interactionist 
theory" as a "perspective" increasing our understanding of deviance. 
I propose that it is still premature to draw the conclusion that labeling theory 
(or, interactionist theory, or, societal reaction theory—whatever it should be called) 
has no etiological value. Let's see if an improved labeling theory can prove to be 
fruitful. I propose that we still entertain the notion that labeling theory can be used to 
guide research intended to seek support for theorized causal relationships concerning 
deviant behavior. I echo Braithwaite's (1989: 17) sentiments regarding the 
propositions of labeling theory: "Whether or not we want to call these collections of 
propositions a theory, they are central to this analysis, and I am concerned to assess 
how they stand up to empirical testing, even if some of the labelists are not." We 
cannot ignore Goode's (1975) point because it is too difficult to argue that "labeling" 
itself is a causal entity. But, maybe it is a process wherein causal stimuli reside. To 
re-conceptualize labeling theory and find it useful, do we have to assign it such 
minimal importance in explaining deviance? After all, we may be tempted to ask if 
labeling is not a theory, a theoretical perspective, or a way to search for causation, 
how much good is it? Although Becker (1973: 34) argued that labeling theory does 
not address etiological questions of deviance, I wonder about his following 
hypothetical example of a self-fulfilling prophecy from Outsiders, which I interpret as 
an etiological statement: 
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... Though the effects of opiate drugs may not impair one's working ability, to 
be known as an addict will probably lead to losing one's job. In such cases, 
the individual finds it difficult to conform to other rules which he had no 
intention or desire to break, and perforce finds himself deviant in these areas 
as well. ...The drug addict finds himself forced [italics mine] into other 
illegitimate kinds of activity, such as robbery and theft, by the refusal of 
respectable employers to have him around. 
In this example, it seems to me as if the drug user is labeled as deviant by others, who 
then cause the drug user to resort to instrumental crime. 
Although new ways of looking at labeling theory are needed, it is also useful 
to return to Merton's (1957) notion of the self-fulfilling prophecy, an idea 
fundamental to understanding labeling processes. I use the concept of the self-
fulfilling prophecy here in the context of human development, and, thus, as a 
relatively long process. I am interested in examining labeling as an ongoing social 
process—as a self-fulfilling prophecy that unfolds over time under the management of 
the labeler and other sanctioning agents. I do not argue that a label simply "sticks" to 
a person and then causes that person to engage in deviant behavior (without 
necessarily continuing to interact with the labeler). I believe it is more likely that the 
causal force behind a label, which often exists as a cognitive representation of an 
individual as somehow faulty, lies in what it does to the persons doing the labeling— 
the thought that a person is deviant shapes our reactions to that person. 
Consequently, it is these reactions, not the "label" itself, that may have a causal 
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impact on the deviant behavior of those labeled as deviant. After all, a self-fulfilling 
prophecy requires not just a "prediction" (here, the label), but also a continuous effort 
on the part of the social agent making the prediction to make it come true. 
Thus, a weakness in traditional labeling theory is that it focuses on the self-
definitions of labeled persons as causal factors in crime while neglecting 
consideration of the impact of the behavior of the labelers toward the labeled. 
Labeling is the Thomas Theorem (Merton, 1957) in action. The label represents a 
"definition of the situation" as real, and it is this definition that helps structure how 
labelers act toward the labeled. The label has "real consequences" in the form of the 
interaction that takes place between labeler and "labelee" (and possibly also in the 
form of the "labelee" acting in accordance with the label). We do not simply "label" 
the person, rather, we are involved in labeling the person, over time. It is not likely 
that individuals, even children, accept socially undesirable self-concepts quickly and 
easily. All self-concepts take a long time to develop, and even in instances when 
individuals are being defined as deviant, they are quite often aware of opposing 
"good" person definitions. Further, as Becker (1973) pointed out, when labeled 
persons do not see the rules they break as legitimate, it is not likely that they will see 
the deviant label as legitimate; they may even see those who judge against them as 
the "outsiders." What if a labeled person never "accepts the label"? Will the person 
automatically cease deviant behavior, or will the labeling agent necessarily change 
the definitions and reactions toward that person? We probably cannot answer these 
questions with a sure "yes." Therefore, "labels" should be examined with regard to 
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how they structure the way labelers interact with those they label as deviant at least as 
much as how they alter the self-definitions of labeled individuals. 
Thus, when we commit a self-fulfilling prophecy using a "label," it is us that 
make the label become valid. If a label as deviant only works through the self-
definition of the person labeled, then it could be said that the labelee makes the 
prophecy come true (from the point of self re-definition on, anyway) by internalizing 
a definition of self as deviant. It would be possible, then, for us to have nothing to do 
with the deviant behavior of the labeled from the point of initial stigmatization on. If 
so, then we are no longer active in fulfilling the prophecy; we have sort of handed it 
off to the labeled. It is doubtful that earlier labeling theorists intended for us to see 
labeling processes in this over-simplified manner. Rather, labeling processes occur 
through the continued engagement between those labeled as deviant and the social 
agents that define and treat them as deviant. 
Finally, a major problem with labeling theory is that it was not supported by 
the research it spawned after it became popular (Goode, 1975; Mankoff, 1999). 
However, labeling research traditionally relied on analyses of cross-sectional data 
(Sampson and Laub, 1997). Labeling theory posits within-individual changes, but 
much labeling research has looked at cross-category differences. It is no wonder 
then, that labeling theory has not been well supported by research; analytical 
strategies unfit to test its propositions have been used. Longitudinal, as opposed to 
cross-sectional, analyses are more appropriate for locating within-individual changes 
(Sampson and Laub, 1997). It makes more sense to examine a cohort over time, in an 
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attempt to uncover the extent to which individuals' deviant behavior is affected by 
social sanctions, as opposed to, say, simply looking at a proportion of a sample that 
recidivates after sanctioning. With this in mind, not only should labeling theory be 
re-conceptualized, but it should also be re-tested in research using longitudinal data. 
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REVISED LABELING THEORY 
Braithwaite's Theory of Reintegrative Shaming 
Perhaps the most prominent contemporary version of labeling theory is John 
Braithwaite's (1989) theory of reintegrative shaming. His theory improves the 
labeling perspective by confronting the apparent fact that sanctioning criminal 
behavior often reduces crime—one mentioned in the previous chapter as a weakness 
of labeling theory. Labeled persons may come to "see the errors of their ways" and 
refrain from offending again or seek some kind of help with their problems. Thus, he 
begins with the realization that labeling sometimes reduces crime and sometimes 
worsens it. Then, he specifies the conditions under which one or the other is likely to 
happen. In general, the type of "shaming" used in societal reactions to crime 
moderates the effects of labeling. It may not be the case that previous research 
showed labeling theory to be wrong—research might just not have specified the 
conditions under which labeling does make crime worse. 
"Shaming" involves some overt expression of disapproval and criticism on the 
part of others for some kind of behavior—some effort to admonish the person 
committing the behavior. According to Braithwaite (1989), shaming can range in 
seriousness from a frown, to a broadcast of the behavior via mass media, to being 
pronounced in court. He does not couple the concepts of "punishment" and 
"shaming," nor does he mention forms of actual punishment, such as spanking or 
imprisonment, in the range of possible forms of shaming. It is not necessary that 
shaming must be strongly punitive to deter crime. Also, shaming is not only a 
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specific response to an individual; it is also a widely held disapproval of certain forms 
of behavior throughout the community. As part of a community's set of values, 
shaming works to control the behavior of offenders and non-offenders alike, 
including pro-actively. For offenders, it is reintegrative specific responses to 
offensive behavior that maintains their susceptibility to community-level shaming 
after what would likely be an atypical episode of offensive behavior on their part. 
When an individual becomes stigmatized, that is, treated as an outcast or 
given deviant master status after committing crime, then labeling is likely to increase 
that individual's criminal behavior. This is known as "disintegrative shaming." On 
the other hand, when the individual is met with "reintegrative shaming," then labeling 
is likely to decrease her or his criminal behavior. Reintegrative shaming involves 
condemnation of criminal behavior that does not cast the individual out, severing her 
or his ties to the community. Favorable regard is still held for the person committing 
crime, and gestures of forgiveness allow for re-acceptance into the community of 
law-abiding citizens. Reintegrative shaming allows the offender to act in a "repentant 
role." It has a "de-labeling effect" and permits the kind of re-gradation ceremony 
(varying from a smile to a formal ceremony) that Becker (1973) and Erikson (1964) 
complained was missing in the process of granting the deviant master status. This 
show to the community publicly de-certifies the offender as deviant. Braithwaite 
(1989: 13) wrote, "Reintegrative shaming controls crime; stigmatization pushes 
offenders toward criminal subcultures." Of course, a strict dichotomy between the 
two types of shaming does not exist—shaming may be relatively reintegrative or 
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disintegrative. Where shaming is more disintegrative than reintegrative, crime should 
be higher; where shaming is more reintegrative than disintegrative, crime should be 
lower. 
Braithwaite (1989) uses integrative theory as a strategy to improve labeling 
theory. First, the theory of integrative shaming incorporates criminal subculture 
theory. By casting offenders out of the mainstream community, disintegrative 
shaming has the result of pushing them toward criminal subcultures. "Subcultures 
supply the outcast offender with the opportunity to reject her rejectors, thereby 
maintaining a form of self-respect" (Braithwaite, 1989: 14). Reintegrative shaming, 
in contrast, retains a place in the community for the offender and thus makes the 
criminal subculture less attractive to the offender. Thus, societies that create a great 
deal of stigmatizing responses to crime may give rise to a high number of criminal 
subcultures. Braithwaite (1989) charged that formal criminal punishment is a poor 
method of social control because it is a "degradation ceremony" that lacks 
reintegrative properties. Second, reintegrative shaming theory incorporates social 
control theory. Shaming works best on persons embedded in highly interdependent 
community networks. Since they have a great deal to lose by offending the 
community, these persons are more receptive to the social control mechanisms 
present in the community. Thus, shaming should work to decrease crime best in more 
communitarian societies. In inner-city communities or competitive corporate 
subcultures, shaming criminal behavior may not be as effective, especially if much of 
the shaming comes from outside of the community. Third, the theory incorporates 
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differential opportunity theory. Again, by casting out the offender, disintegrative 
shaming distances the offender from legitimate opportunities (such as employment), 
while making illegitimate opportunities like crime more attractive. In contrast, 
reintegrative shaming gives legitimate opportunities back to the offender. Finally, the 
theory incorporates social learning theory. Disintegrative shaming segregates 
offenders into criminal subcultures, wherein they learn the values, beliefs, and 
techniques that promotes criminal behavior. Reintegrative shaming keeps offenders 
in the mainstream community, wherein they continue to learn the ways of conformity. 
Labeling Theory as "Developmental Criminology" 
To make labeling theory and research more congruent, work on labeling 
should be guided by conceptual schemes and analytical strategies designed to 
examine within-individual changes. The criminological literature contains work that 
may be used to improve labeling theory. Perhaps the best approach to take is what 
Loeber and Le Blanc (1990) refer to as "developmental criminology." In general, 
life-span developmental research is concerned with the link between early behavior 
and later behavior and life circumstances (Caspi, Elder, and Herbener, 1990). 
Developmental criminology is the study of the development of problematic behaviors 
with age, as well as the factors that initiate and direct the course of this development. 
It should be fairly easy to accept labeling theory arguments as developmental ones. 
Generally, labeling theory posits that deviant behavior at some "time one" is related 
to deviant behavior at some "time three" through societal reaction factors that bring 
about developmental changes in between—during some "time two" period. 
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An important methodological advantage of a developmental approach to the 
study of crime is that it involves longitudinal analyses that allow us to better 
distinguish "causes" of crime from mere correlates of crime. The "before-and-after" 
measurement design in longitudinal data satisfies the temporal order criterion for 
establishing cause and effect. Through longitudinal data, individuals' paths to (or 
away from) criminal careers may be uncovered (Loeber and Le Blanc, 1990). A 
developmental approach to studying labeling processes is needed if labeling theory is 
to be used to search for causes. 
As opposed to following an ontogenetic model, a developmental perspective 
on labeling is concerned with social development, since labeling processes involve 
individuals' interactions and transactions with the social environment. Labeling 
theory deals with changes in "self," social status, social relationships, and life 
circumstance. Of primary concern to a developmental labeling theory, then, is 1. 
Human development in its social context, 2. Social environmental influences that 
operate independently from biological influences, 3. Social environmental influences 
that do not necessarily result in physiological changes (Rutter, 1989). For example, 
our culturally defined role expectations help determine our developmental contexts. 
Caspi, Elder, and Herbener (1990: 31) state "Transitions and adjustments to new roles 
and relationships are the core social-developmental tasks people face across the life 
course." Societal reactions to persons defined as deviant may be examined with 
regard to their interference with performance in age-graded roles, especially those 
concerned with school, peers, family, and work. 
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More appropriate to labeling theory is a "sociogenic" model of development 
(Sampson and Laub, 2001b). As are all aspects of human development, social 
development is a matter of both change and stability. New experiences result in intra-
individual changes, but people carry with them the results of earlier experiences. 
Although individual characteristics at one age do not necessarily predict specific 
changes at future ages, earlier characteristics, problem behavior for instance, may be 
exhibited at later ages (Rutter, 1989). One of the most consistent patterns found in 
social scientific research is the stability of anti-social behavior over time (Sampson 
and Laub, 2001a). However, the specific problem behaviors are likely to change over 
time. It is also important then, to examine the ways in which individuals confront 
changing circumstances. Persistent deviant behavior is not necessarily a case of 
heterotypic continuity. Developmental research may involve the identification of 
early attributes as predictors of later developmental outcomes without necessarily 
searching for the persistence of specific traits (Caspi, Elder, and Herbener, 1990). 
The lesson for labeling theory here is that the connection between earlier and later 
deviant behavior may be determined by factors other than stable self-concepts, and 
that labeling processes may even be disrupted by social factors. 
We should expect to find changes in criminal behavior as individuals grow 
from childhood to adulthood. Arguing for the utility of a developmental approach to 
studying crime, Thomberry (1997) points out that that the relationship between age 
and criminal behavior is a fairly consistent finding in criminological research (see 
also Partington, 1997). This research strongly suggests that delinquent and criminal 
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behavior change with age in an orderly manner. During childhood, actual illegal 
behavior is relatively uncommon, but the anti-social behaviors that serve as 
precursors to later illegal behavior are not. The onset of illegal behavior increases 
greatly during late childhood and early adolescence. The prevalence of illegal 
behavior peaks at around middle to late adolescence (around 17). This peak is 
followed by a rapid decline, with most offending tapering off during young 
adulthood. Labeling theory may be broadened to include an understanding of how 
efforts at social control play a part in determining changes in anti-social and illegal 
behavior across stage transitions. 
From Thomberry (1997), we can see that developmental perspectives on 
crime are useful for the following reasons. First, they identify and explain some 
important dimensions of criminal behavior: prevalence, age of onset, duration of 
careers, escalation and de-escalation (with regard to both the frequency and 
seriousness of the behavior), and desistance. (It is important to note that the factors 
that explain any one of these dimensions do not necessarily explain any of the others.) 
Second, they distinguish between offenders who begin early and have long careers 
from those that begin late and offend for a relatively brief period (usually middle to 
late adolescence). The factors that explain one type of offender do not necessarily 
explain the other, and the identification of these two types makes it important to 
explain both stability and change in criminal behavior over time. For instance, 
Simons et al. (1994) found that oppositional/defiant behavior was present in paths to 
criminal justice system involvement for "early starters" of delinquency but not for 
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"late starters." Third, they focus attention on the precursors and consequences of 
criminal behavior instead of just factors present during the offending. Behavioral 
problems in earlier childhood may precede later illegal behavior, and involvement in 
illegal behavior has consequences for later psychosocial development. Fourth, 
developmental perspectives use knowledge of the developmental changes occurring 
over the life-course to explain patterns of criminal behavior. 
Criminal behavior development may be examined in relation to major life 
transitions and changes in social environment. For example, as children proceed from 
home to elementary school, then to high school, then to work or college, their 
offending behavior may take on a different character as a result of factors present 
during these transitions. As individuals grow older, they may initiate, increase, 
decrease, or cease offending, and they may change over to different forms of 
offending behaviors or mix them. At issue is if these quantitative and qualitative 
changes in individual offending develop across time in an identifiable organized 
sequence. Taking some principles from developmental psychology, Loeber and Le 
Blanc (1990: 378) state that it may be worthwhile to determine "whether the course of 
offending is predictable, hierarchical, and orderly." They review evidence that 
suggests that there are anti-social behavioral sequences that can be combined into 
different developmental trajectories. Also, some important questions concerning the 
way "causes" of crime operate across the life span need to be answered. Are crime 
factors stable across time? Are different factors at work depending on whether 
offending begins at early versus late ages? Which factors have immediate effects, 
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and which ones take a long time to operate? And, which factors have singular effects, 
and which ones operate with others to have cumulative, longitudinal effects? All of 
these are developmental questions (Loeber and Le Blanc, 1990). 
Developmental research is needed to better understand continuity in anti­
social behavior. As Loeber and Le Blanc (1990) assert, studies examining continuity 
in anti-social behavior are useful for three reasons. First, they show that this 
continuity is higher for some people more than others are. Second, they explore the 
extent to which continuity between conduct problems and crime reflects continuity of 
more general deviance. And third, they identify "early markers" that distinguish 
between life-course persistent and age-limited offending. Some research finds that 
specific problem behaviors such as lying and truancy predict later general 
delinquency, and children who exhibit the earliest onset of anti-social behavior stand 
the greatest chance of continuing into adult crime, especially if the onset behavior is 
serious and frequent (Loeber and LeBlanc, 1990). Additionally, since development 
also involves desirable experiences, it is important for research to identify both risk 
and protective factors (and the interactions between them) (Rutter, 1989). 
Patterson, DeBaryshe, and Ramsey (1989) believe that research supports the 
contention that anti-social behavior is a developmental trait that begins during early 
childhood (as early as grade school) and often continues into adolescence and 
adulthood, and this course is marked by an identifiable sequence of experiences. 
They present a developmental model of anti-social behavior that begins with 
ineffective parenting practices that lead to children's conduct problems during early 
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childhood. Child conduct problems then lead to social rejection (by conventional 
peers) and academic failure during middle childhood. Social rejection and academic 
failure are followed in late childhood and adolescence by deviant peer association, 
and then delinquency. Patterson et al. (1989) point out that children who follow this 
sequence are at high risk for chronic offending, although they are careful to 
acknowledge that most children who engage in anti-social behavior do not become 
anti-social adults. 
Similarly, Moffitt (1993) offers a dual developmental taxonomy of anti-social 
behavior that sheds more light on the relationship between age and crime (the "age-
crime curve"). She believes that the aggregate delinquency rates conceal two distinct 
categories of offenders: "life-course persistent" and "adolescent-limited." As these 
terms suggest, the two categories reveal different patterns of offending. Life-course 
persistent offenders exhibit rather stable and persistent anti-social behavior, beginning 
in early childhood and continuing into adulthood. This type of behavior is committed 
by a relatively small number of youths, mostly male. In contrast, the anti-social 
behavior of adolescent-limiteds is temporary and situational—mostly restricted to the 
teenage years. This type of behavior is far more common than persistent offending. 
Most of the peak offending during teenage years is due to the activity of adolescent-
limited offenders, while the far less frequent pre- and post-peak offending is due to 
the activity of the life-course persistents. These contrasting patterns suggest a need 
for separate causal explanations. Moffitt (1993) suggests that adolescent-limited 
offending is due to more proximal factors specific to adolescence. The absence of 
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these factors after adolescence explains discontinuity in the offending of adolescent-
limiteds. The factors explaining persistent offending, on the other hand, are present 
in early childhood, perhaps at birth. Cumulative interactions between children's 
neuro-psychological problems and poor socialization environments may result in a 
pathological personality that is responsible for anti-social behavior that continues 
across developmental stages. 
Work on developmental criminology may be used to improve the study of 
labeling processes and their outcomes. In fact, Loeber and LeBlanc (1990: 421) 
mention labeling theory as an exception when charging that "Most criminological 
theories are not developmental in nature." Their approach calls for an examination of 
differences in offending between different times in an individual's life, rather than 
offending differences between groups or categories of people. This is important to 
the study of labeling processes in that labeling theory generally posits that offending 
may be attributed to changes in an individual's self-definition or social context. 
Labeling theory does not directly implicate factors that may be present for some 
social categories as opposed to others, although some may be more vulnerable or 
exposed to labeling than others might. Theory and research based on comparisons 
between individuals tend to propose static causes of deviant behavior, which does not 
explain variation within individuals' behavior over time—the fact that people change. 
For instance, it is well known that while most adult criminal behavior can be traced 
back to childhood anti-social behavior, most children who exhibit anti-social behavior 
do not become adult criminals. Thus, static variables proposed to cause crime are 
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weak in prospectively explaining trajectories of crime over an individual's life course 
(Sampson, 2001). Loeber and Le Blanc (1990) review research that reveal 
developmental sequences including ones in which individuals proceed from minor 
delinquency to more serious offenses. It is important to locate the variables that 
initiate and sustain this sequence. Labeling theory is useful for examining the part 
that institutions of social control, such as the criminal justice system, play in human 
development and persistent offending. 
The Life Course Perspective and Criminology 
As Sampson and Laub (2001 ) point out, the age-crime curve has inspired a 
great deal of crime and delinquency studies to focus on adolescents. However, 
characteristics and experiences during early childhood—the time before the sharp 
increase—and early adulthood—the time after the sharp decrease—may also be 
theoretically significant. Research also indicates an early onset of illegal behavior 
that continues over the life course. Therefore, the search for the causes of crime 
should be extended to include the impact of earlier childhood characteristics as well 
as links between childhood experiences and later adult outcomes. Since crime 
decreases sharply after adolescence, it is important to study the transition from illegal 
to legal behavior in adulthood and what it has to do with other transitions occurring 
within the general transition from adolescence to adulthood. There are also important 
questions concerning the nature of factors that bring about desistance; for instance, 
are they unique or just the opposite of the factors causing crime? A life course 
perspective on crime is concerned with how individuals' illegal behavior changes as 
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they proceed through the stages of the life course. To better understand the 
relationship between age and crime, present knowledge concerning the etiology of 
crime should be viewed with respect to the age-graded transitions that occur during 
the life course (Sampson and Laub, 2001a). The question here is what are the effects 
of labeling across life stages? 
Labeling theory offers an explanation of how individuals get caught up in 
criminal careers. A criminal career is a longitudinal, developmental, sequence of 
illegal behavior committed by an individual over the life course (Blumstein et al., 
2001; Farrington, 1997). A recognizable onset and desistance mark the duration of a 
criminal career. However, since chronic offending is typically preceded and followed 
by non-illegal anti-social behavior (such as hyperactivity in early childhood and 
alcohol abuse in adulthood), criminal careers represent the legally defined mid­
section of wider anti-social careers (Farrington, 1997). The criminal career 
perspective presumes that offending behavior is not spread throughout an entire 
population, rather, it is committed by an ever-changing sub-population—active 
offenders (Blumstein et al., 2001; Farrington, 1997). As opposed to simply 
examining general aggregate crime rates, the study of criminal careers recognizes 
offenders from non-offenders as well as the differential frequency, rate of escalation 
(or de-escalation), specialization, duration, and seriousness of illegal behavior among 
offenders. Criminal career studies may reveal how each of these dimensions is 
influenced by different factors. Since these dimensions go uncovered in aggregate 
crime data, criminal career analyses rely on individual level data. A criminal career 
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can range from committing a few, perhaps relatively minor, crimes to serious chronic 
offending (Blumstein et al., 2001; Farrington, 1997). Labeling theory offers a more 
plausible explanation for more chronic offending as compared to "dabbling" in illegal 
behavior. 
According to Rutter (1989: 28), "the investigation of pathways from 
childhood to adult life requires an analysis of a quite complicated set of linkages over 
time." In addition to a direct and more immediate influence, social factors may have 
an indirect and more long-term influence on development (Caspi, Elder, and 
Herbener, 1990; Rutter, 1989). A factor may set in motion a "chain reaction" in 
which a harmful experience or environment leads to another (or a helpful experience 
or environment leads to another), as when academic failure leads to under­
employment which leads to poor living conditions. Even increases in psychological 
functioning may be derived from the "cumulative effect" of social experiences 
(Rutter, 1989). It is important to note that these contingencies, or chains of 
"successes" or "failures," contrast with the notion that social success and failure are 
composed of repetitive consequences of a personal trait or attribute, such as 
intelligence. A popular assertion in criminology is that the correlation between past 
and future deviance is spurious, because life-course stable crime is due to an 
underlying criminal propensity present in a portion of a diverse population. In 
contrast, a life-course argument on criminal stability would hold, or at least imply, 
that the relationship between past and future deviance is causal (Sampson and Laub, 
2001a). 
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At issue here is what "causes" continuity in exhibited characteristics, such as 
anti-social behavior. Adults with conduct problems often exhibited conduct problems 
as children. For example, aggressive behavior and peer rejection during childhood 
predict dropping out of school, adult crime, and other problems during adulthood 
(Rutter, 1989). Rutter (1989: 29) states "it remains uncertain whether low peer 
acceptance is merely an incidental correlate of persisting psychopathological 
disturbance or whether it plays a causal role in continuities over time because it 
predisposes to deviant socialization experiences and opportunities." At any rate, 
continuities in conduct problems do not necessarily stem from intrinsic 
psychopathological processes; the persistence of conduct problems may reflect "the 
continuation of the psychosocial risk factors that gave rise to the children's problems 
in the first place (Rutter, 1989: 29). The shaping of one's environment is a possible 
mediating factor for continuities (and discontinuities). Children's behavior and 
experiences help shape their adult environments. Children's problem behavior puts a 
strain on peers and adults, thus creating an increased likelihood of future stressful 
environments, and of course continued problematic experiences grow from these 
stressful environments. As Rutter (1989: 30) states, "the strong implication is that 
behavioural disturbance predisposes to an increased likelihood of adverse 
psychosocial experiences or life events in adult life." 
Taking direction from life course and developmental theory, we may argue 
that labeling processes work through the "shaping of environment." Rutter (1989: 
42), himself states "...antisocial behaviour also will influence later environments 
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through the societal responses that it induces—such as custodial or correctional 
actions that may serve both to 'label' and to strengthen antisocial peer group 
influences, as well as potentially to create more adaptive environments." It is 
important to remember that it is not just the individual that develops, but also the 
individual's social context. The life span is not just a timeline of intra-individual 
changes, but also a timeline of social experiences occurring within specific 
environments. Although individuals play a major part in shaping their own 
environments, factors external to the individual such as the behavior of others also 
play a major part. As Sampson and Laub (2001: 35) state, "behavioral patterns may 
show stability simply because the contextual environment remains stable." Thus, 
external factors also play a causal role in the path from earlier experiences to later 
ones. In some labeling processes, for instance, societal responses to deviance may 
create an increased likelihood that a person will be placed in future social 
environments that promote deviance, without necessarily bringing about a significant 
change in the intrinsic state of the individual. 
A Life-Course Conceptualization of Labeling Theory 
Thomberry (1987: 864) writes "...human behavior occurs in social interaction 
and can therefore best be explained by models that focus on interactive processes." 
Labeling theory locates the causes of deviant behavior in processes of social 
interaction. Therefore, it shares a basic similarity with Thomberry's (1987) 
"interactional theory of delinquency," which stands as an integration of social control 
and social learning theories into a developmental framework. In contrast to more 
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static portrayals of delinquent behavior, delinquency is seen to result from children's 
interactions with individuals and institutions over time. Through interaction with 
control agents such as parents and school, weak bonds to conventional society are 
formed, which then lend youth more "freedom" to enter environments in which the 
learning and reinforcing of delinquent behavior take place. It should be noted here 
that weakened bonds do not "cause" delinquency, per se; they merely allow for a 
wider range of possible behaviors, including conformity. Both weakened bonds and 
"bad" learning environments are needed to produce delinquency. 
Conversely, children who form close bonds with their parents are more likely 
to commit to and do well in school, adopt conventional values, and therefore refrain 
from delinquency. These three "bonding variables" are not static or simply related to 
each other in a linear way. Attachment to parents, commitment to school, and belief 
in conventional values are dynamic attributes of the person that interact with each 
other in developmental processes. For some children, the levels of these bonds 
increase over time in an upward reinforcing spiral, while for others, the reciprocal 
relationship between these bonds means they further weaken each other over time 
(Thomberry, 1987). This ongoing reciprocal relationship may be seen in Chambliss' 
(2000) portrayal of the Saints and the Roughnecks. He proposed that alienation from 
the community granted the Roughnecks more freedom to express disregard for 
legitimate authority. In turn, the community was offended by this show of disregard 
and increased its disregard for the Roughnecks. This exchange continued over time, 
perpetuating the process of the Roughneck's commitment to deviance. Chambliss 
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indicated that it takes an event external to this kind of relationship to disrupt the 
process, pointing out that the two most successful Roughnecks received college 
athletic scholarships. In contrast, but by the same mechanism, the reciprocal 
relationship between the Saints and the community reinforced a process of a lack of 
commitment to deviance, despite that they engaged in deviant behavior during 
adolescence. Maintaining ties to the mainstream community made it easier for the 
Saints to settle into career conformity after leaving adolescence. 
Further, the relationship between these processes—social bonding and 
learning—and delinquency is also reciprocal. Delinquency is as much a part of social 
developmental processes as it is their outcome. Acting now as an "independent 
variable," delinquency will illicit varying behavioral responses by others (often either 
punishing or reinforcing). The result is that delinquency further weakens social ties 
and predisposes youth to further deviant learning environments (Thomberry, 1987). 
This is, generally, very similar to the most convincing argument made in labeling 
theory: segregating individuals from conforming members of the community guides 
them toward social environments promoting deviance. Thomberry (1987) uses an 
interactional, developmental perspective to elaborate on social control theory. The 
same approach may be used to elaborate labeling theory. The point to be made is that 
labeling processes are interactive processes that result in delinquency, over significant 
spans of time. 
Thomberry's (1987) interactional theory is developmental in that it recognizes 
the different institutions of social control operating at different life stages, as well as 
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the relationship between these stage-contingent social controls. Also, the structure of 
social interaction and learning environments are different at different stages. At 
earlier ages, parents are likely the most instrumental in determining their children's 
environments and developing their bonds to the community. By middle adolescence, 
influence shifts away from the family to school and peers, although interactions 
during earlier childhood play a part in determining later school and peer bonds and 
environments. During this stage, the determinants of delinquency are likely to lie 
outside of the home. Also, any delinquent values learned during earlier stages may 
now act as causes of delinquency. During later adolescence/early adulthood, 
importance shifts to other institutional settings that are, again, influenced by the 
interactions that took place in earlier life stages. Gainful employment, attending 
college, marriage, and military service are conventional activities that deter persons 
from delinquency and crime. These are likely precipitated by factors such as close 
relationships with parents, academic success, and involvement with pro-social peers. 
In contrast, activities pertaining to matters such as under-employment, poor adult 
relationships, and incarceration block involvement in conventional activities. These 
are often precipitated by factors such as poor relationships with parents, academic 
failure, anti-social peer involvement, and juvenile justice system involvement. 
The interplay of social bonds, learning environments, and delinquency over 
time may be expressed in terms of two basic diverging behavioral trajectories. First, 
some youth develop weak bonds with their parents during early childhood and 
become weakly committed to school by early adolescence. These youth are more 
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likely to associate with delinquent peers, adopt delinquent values (and reject 
conventional values), and engage in delinquent behavior. Delinquency involvement 
then further weakens bonds to parents and school. The mutual reinforcement 
between weakening social bonds and increasing delinquency during middle 
adolescence makes it very difficult to (re-) establish bonds to conventional society 
during late adolescence, when delinquency is likely to continue or perhaps even 
increase. This trajectory may characterize the lives of "life-course persistent 
offenders" (Moffitt, 1993). On the other hand, non-delinquent youth proceed in an 
opposite direction. They become attached to their parents, commit to school, adopt 
conventional values, associate with non-delinquent peers, and engage in conventional 
activities. Strong social bonds and pro-social behavior mutually reinforce each other 
in such a way that "buffers" youth from delinquent environments throughout 
developmental stages. "Adolescent-limited offenders," despite exhibiting some anti­
social behavior, may be characterized more by this trajectory (Moffitt, 1993). These 
two trajectories, of course, represent extreme possibilities. The degree to which 
children bond, commit to school, adopt conventional and delinquent values, associate 
with delinquent and conventional peers, and engage in delinquent and conventional 
activities vary greatly within these two extremes (Thomberry, 1987). 
Recently, Sampson and Laub (1997) integrated labeling theory with an "age-
graded" version of social control theory, within a life-course perspective. As Loeber 
and Le Blanc (1990) argue, integrated criminological theories may benefit from a 
developmental perspective. Sampson and Laub (1997) see labeling theory as 
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developmental in nature because it emphasizes processes over time. Much like 
Thornberry (1987), their (life-course) theory of cumulative disadvantage and criminal 
stability locates the causes of stable criminal behavior in social interactions and 
processes of social control (although they point out that it is not their intention to 
negate the roles of self-selection and individual differences in explaining criminal 
stability). Important are the structural constraints that can emerge as a consequence 
of labeling (such as difficulty in re-integration following long-term incarceration) 
rather than re-definitions of self. In fact, Sampson and Laub (1997) maintain the 
possibility that labeling effects occur without a re-definition of self. This idea fits 
well with the notion of a self-fulfilling prophecy—agents or agencies involved in 
defining persons as deviant play an active part in bringing about their future deviance. 
The idea also complements Tannenbaum's (1994) discussion of the segregating 
effects of labeling. Persons need not necessarily acquire a "deviant personality" to 
experience labeling effects. Again, one of the problems with past analyses of labeling 
processes may have been an over-emphasis on what labeling does to the "labelee" and 
a lack of emphasis on what it does to the labeler(s). 
Some research does focus attention on the behavior of sanctioning agents. For 
example, Sampson (1986) found negative relationships between neighborhood SES 
and police contact (independent of actual law-violative behavior) and between 
individual SES and subsequent court referrals (independent of self-reported 
delinquency and police records). These findings suggest that the police and courts 
may be more willing to label lower SES youth as delinquent. Also, research by 
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Matsueda (1992) suggests that parents with lower SES backgrounds may be more 
inclined to label their children as deviant. Further, he found that non-white parents, 
urban parents, and parents of delinquents were more likely to label their children as 
"rule violators," although these effects were mostly indirect through prior 
delinquency. Thornberry (1987) points out that structural variables such as race, 
class, sex, and residence influence the values of the variables that initiate 
developmental processes that lead to either deviant or conventional behavior. This 
relationship is important in that interactional theory posits that the initial values of the 
process variables set in motion the paths of behavioral trajectories. Labeling theory 
may assist in explaining how structural variables influence social processes resulting 
in criminal behavior, as it may be the case that social status is used as an object in 
definitions of persons as deviant. 
Sampson and Laub developed and tested their ideas on social control across 
the life course in earlier work (Laub and Sampson, 1993; Sampson and Laub, 1990; 
Sampson and Laub, 1997). In their work, they retain the basic claim of social control 
theory: individuals are more likely to commit deviant acts when their ties to 
mainstream social institutions are poor. These social ties serve as avenues through 
which individual behavior is regulated (or, controlled) by social institutions. Further, 
they recognize that different institutions of social control are at work over an 
individual's life span. As children mature, they take on different role relationships 
within different social institutional settings, and they are required to develop other 
social ties. Thus, Sampson and Laub "contend that pathways to both crime and 
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conformity are modified by key institutions of social control in the transition to 
adulthood" (Laub and Sampson, 1993: 304). By arguing that the nature of social ties 
vary at different periods in an individual's life span, they present a more dynamic 
version of social control that can actually be used to help explain both stability and 
change in criminal behavior over time. Thus, the likelihood that an individual will 
commit crime during childhood, adolescence, and adulthood may depend upon the 
quality of that individual's ties to family, school, work, the community, etc., 
especially with regard to the part these institutions play in key life transitions. Or, as 
they put it, "age-graded changes in social bonds explain changes in crime" (142). 
Sampson and Laub's earlier work put special emphasis on "informal social 
control," that which is provided by social institutions whose primary purpose is not to 
control crime such as family, work, and school (as opposed to criminal justice 
systems). More recently, they extended their theory of informal social control to 
include formal social control, and they argue that their framework can also absorb 
labeling theory (Sampson and Laub, 1997). Societal reactions to suppress illegal 
behavior by agents of the criminal justice system also play a part in determining the 
likelihood that sanctioned persons will continue or discontinue their illegal behavior. 
However, to begin, they point out that much anti-social behavior begins early in 
childhood and reason that efforts by agents of social control to suppress this behavior 
(societal reaction) also begin early. Over time a series of these delinquent actions and 
control reactions accumulate incrementally to produce developmental effects. 
Sampson and Laub (1997) incorporate the concepts of state dependence and 
71 
cumulative disadvantage to articulate labeling processes that occur across the life 
course. Consistent with the "stepping stone" principle of the life course perspective, 
the labeling of deviant behavior at one point in a person's life increases the likelihood 
that a person will engage in deviant behavior at a future point in life. Intra-individual 
stability in criminal behavior over time could be a matter of cumulative continuity, 
whereby the consequences of one's delinquent behavior progressively "cut off" 
legitimate opportunities, or a matter of interactional continuity, whereby the "labeler" 
participates in increasing the likelihood of continued criminal behavior through 
prolonged interaction with the "labelee." 
A labeling event serves as a "turning point," which initiates a kind of 
"snowball effect." The sanctioning of those labeled as deviant severs the social bonds 
that facilitate social control, largely by structurally constraining opportunities for 
social integration (such as school activities and employment), which decreases the 
likelihood that efforts at social control will work on labeled persons in the future. 
Over one's life course, the weakening of social bonds leads to an accumulation of 
disadvantages in finding legitimate opportunities. Thus, a labeled person's "stake in 
conformity" reduces over time, perpetuating an increased likelihood that such a 
person will engage in future deviant acts. Sampson and Laub (1997: 145) write, "The 
cumulative continuity of disadvantage is thus not only a result of stable individual 
differences in criminal propensity, but a dynamic process whereby childhood 
antisocial behavior and adolescent delinquency foster adult crime through the 
severance of adult social bonds." At the same time, age-graded social ties may also 
72 
be seen as state-dependent, and mediated by crime. Through crime and the social 
responses it elicits, poor social ties to certain institutions during one life stage lead to 
poor ties to other institutions in later stages. For example, poor ties with school could 
lead to crime and involvement with the juvenile justice system, which could then 
obstruct the development of work and marital ties during early adulthood (Sampson 
and Laub, 1997). 
At least one piece of research by Sampson and Laub (1993) may be seen as a 
test of structural labeling theory and the effects of formal social control, using life-
course principles. As they point out, existing research has demonstrated that job 
stability is negatively associated with later crime. But in a quantitative re-analysis of 
the Glueck and Glueck Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency project data, they found that 
length of incarceration as a juvenile or young adult was negatively associated with 
later job stability, which was then negatively associated with continued criminal 
involvement. Interestingly enough, they found no direct effects between 
incarceration and later criminal behavior. This mediation suggests support for a state-
dependence argument behind labeling theory—that stigmatizing experiences with 
agents of formal social control reduce legitimate opportunities and thus encourage 
illegitimate ones. 
So far, I have discussed work such as Sampson and Laub (1997) and 
Thornberry (1987) that integrates a developmental/life-course perspective and social 
control theory with labeling theory. However, their work also opens the door for 
social learning theory to be brought into this mix, especially with respect to 
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Thornberry's emphasis on the developmental effects of social environment. Labeling 
theory and learning theory are integrated through considering the relationship 
between societal reactions to deviance and deviant learnzing environments. Social 
learning theories generally posit that individuals learn deviant norms, values, beliefs, 
and practices from socialization agents who engage in deviant behavior, such as 
parents, other adult role models in the community, and p»eer groups. This learning 
then leads to deviant behavior on the part of the individual. Accepting that deviant 
environments lead to deviant behavior, an important etiological question must still be 
asked: How do individuals get placed in deviant social learning environments? 
One possible answer to this question is that labeling puts them there. The acts 
of defining, segregating, and treating individuals as deviant may result in directing 
them toward affiliation with deviant persons. Theoretically speaking, then, we may 
argue that associations with deviant others mediates the relationship between labeling 
and continued deviance. Tannenbaum (1994) said, early on, that stigmatized children 
become integrated with other deviant children and come to identify with them, while 
developing a hostile orientation toward mainstream society. Since the punishment of 
deviance is often segregating, relationships with deviant [persons become easier to 
develop, perhaps easier than relationships with conforming persons. Thus, the 
labeled child develops ties with persons who commit deviance—those who can help 
get him/her in trouble and alienates from the people who conform—those who can 
help keep him/her out of trouble. This makes sense especially with regard to youth 
placed in treatment facilities, detention, or prison. While "locked up," youth are 
74 
certainly placed in environments promoting close contact with other offenders and 
separated from relatively law-abiding people. Upon release, incarceration may have 
provided youth with deviant "contacts." and it may make it difficult for youth to 
develop relationships with law-abiding members of the community. Both guide 
incarcerated youth into deviant social networks promoting future illegal behavior. 
We may search for labeling effects over relatively smaller periods of time 
with regard to one social institutional setting. For example, we could focus on 
cyclical patterns of interaction between parents and young children whereby parental 
reactions to child deviant behavior promote further deviant behavior which, in turn, 
draw similar parental reactions, and so on. However, we could also search for 
labeling effects across different institutional settings involved at various periods over 
the wider life span, whereby the effects of social control efforts may be contingent 
upon the consequences of social control efforts in prior institutional settings. Based 
on the contentions of Sampson and Laub (1997) and other developmental theorists, it 
seems to me that the following hypothetical pathway may be proposed. 
Beginning in early childhood, anti-social behavior on the part of a child may 
be met with harsh, ineffective discipline on the part of a parent. This discipline, then, 
promotes further anti-social behavior on the part of the child. Repetitive exchanges 
of this nature over time lead to improper socialization and the development of weak 
bonds to parents. Later, after reaching school age, the child does not possess the 
social skills and ties needed to be successful in school. Continued anti-social 
behavior is therefore a strong possibility, which may lead to segregation from 
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mainstream school activities by school authorities as well as rejection by "pro-social" 
peers. Conflicting relations, especially with teachers, make it difficult for the child to 
be academically successful. Without a good academic start, academic success later, 
say in junior high or high school, becomes more difficult. Academic failure may 
serve as a "push factor," steering the child away from legitimate activities. Further, 
without strong social ties to mainstream peers and school or community activities, the 
child may associate with other "anti-social" children and engage in illegal activities 
by adolescence. Prolonged delinquency is likely to result in juvenile justice system 
involvement, which further disrupts the child's chances of doing well in school and 
associating with pro-social peers (especially if the child becomes incarcerated). By 
early adulthood, access to legitimate opportunities such as college and gainful 
employment have been reduced, perhaps due largely to social settings that do not 
foster requisite social and intellectual skills. And by now, the social experiences 
needed to develop ties to adult social institutions have not accumulated. Thus, adult 
crime and involvement in the adult criminal justice system becomes more likely, 
possibly resulting in incarceration and a prison record. A prison record may be seen 
as an institutionalized label, which serves as a basis for discrimination against former 
prisoners in providing legitimate opportunities, such as employment. Integration into 
the mainstream community becomes blocked. Again, legitimate opportunities are 
cut-off, which makes illegal opportunities more viable for the labeled adult. 
This hypothetical pathway illustrates how persistent criminal behavior may be 
explained in terms of interactional continuity involving persons defined as deviant 
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and those reacting to their deviance, regardless (but not discounting) of the recurring 
effects of a possible "anti-social behavior trait." It also illustrates the state 
dependence between early anti-social behavior and later delinquency and crime—how 
"clashes" between deviant behavior and societal reactions intended to suppress it can 
lead to an accumulation of social disadvantages that promote the likelihood that one 
will engage in criminal behavior. As Sampson and Laub (1997: 154) put it, "the 
stability of (delinquent) behavior may reflect more the stability of social response 
than the time-invariance of an individual trait" (parentheses added). 
I do not propose to discard the self-concept approach to labeling and replace it 
with a more structural approach. Labeling theory should be improved by considering 
the different ways that societal reactions to deviance themselves promote further 
deviance. Different approaches to labeling theory should be complimentary, and we 
should be able to integrate them. Since the "self develops over time, and the 
structural effects of labeling also occur over time, it should not be impossible to 
conceive that deviant identity formation processes and cumulative disadvantages 
occur simultaneously and perhaps influence each other. As Sampson and Laub 
(1997) point out, a modified approach to labeling as taken by Link and associates 
(1989) with regard to the labeling of mental health disorders would also be beneficial 
for re-conceptualizing labeling and delinquency. 
The Model to be Tested 
This analysis will test the proposition that involvement with sanctioning 
agents is related to individuals' later deviant behavior. Sampson and Laub's (1997) 
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life course theory of informal social control has been noticeably tested in research. 
For example, in analyses of data from the Iowa Youth and Families Project (IYFP), 
Simons et al. (1998) found more support for a life course perspective, compared to a 
"latent trait" perspective, on the stability of anti-social behavior. They found that 
oppositional/defiant behavior during late childhood led to poor quality of parenting, 
low school commitment, and affiliation with deviant peers, which then led to conduct 
problems later in adolescence (improved parenting, increased school commitment, 
and reduced deviant peer affiliation reduced the likelihood of this stability). These 
findings suggest that prior anti-social behavior leads to later anti-social behavior via 
reduced social control. However, to date, I am not aware of much research testing 
Sampson and Laub's extension of the life course perspective to formal social control 
and labeling. I use data collected by Simons and colleagues as part of the IYFP to 
test for a positive relationship between involvement with formal control agents and 
illegal behavior across multiple waves. 
Support for a more structural conceptualization of labeling theory of 
delinquency and crime may begin with an empirical test of its primary assumption: 
that punitive societal reactions to crime increase the likelihood of future crime. The 
argument in this re-conceptualization may be summarized as follows. When their 
illegal activities are discovered, law violators are "defined," or, "labeled" as deviant 
by representatives of the criminal justice system (for example, the police through 
arrests, and the courts through sentencing). Then, correctional agents administer 
punishment (such as admonishment, probation, "placement," and incarceration) in 
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such a way that reduces law violators' opportunities to engage in mainstream 
activities in the future (which itself makes illegitimate opportunities such as crime a 
more viable—although not necessary—option). In other words, the criminal justice 
system "assists" law violators in "mortgaging their futures." With less legitimate 
opportunities, a person's stake in conformity is reduced, is thus less subject to social 
control, and is thus less likely to refrain from engaging in criminal behavior. Further, 
since segregating punishment guides persons toward deviant peer associations, 
illegitimate opportunities become more available, and thus more likely to be taken. 
Empirically, then, we should expect that experiences with sanctioning agents at some 
prior time would predict, or help predict, criminal behavior at a later time. 
Taking direction from the developmental and life-course perspectives, this 
analysis will examine the relationship between criminal justice system involvement 
and illegal behavior across life stages—from late childhood (junior high school) to 
adolescence (high school) and to early adulthood. Since it is unlikely that many 
children will be involved with the criminal justice system during early childhood, it 
seems sensible to begin the longitudinal analysis with the early teen years. 
Before presenting the actual model to be tested, let me begin to explain its 
evolution by presenting a theoretical model that summarizes some fairly consistent 
trends in research on crime (Figure 2). One such trend is the stability of anti-social 
behavior across time (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Moffitt, 1993; Sampson and 
Laub, 1997). Although it should be noted that most anti-social children discontinue 
anti-social behavior by adulthood (Laub and Sampson, 1993; Moffitt, 1993; Sampson 
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Figure 2. Model exhibiting persistent offending and deviant peer associations 
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and Laub, 1997), a strong predictor of delinquency and crime is prior delinquency 
and crime (or other early anti-social behavior) (Kaplan, 1984). Anti-social behavior 
during early and late childhood may be followed by delinquency durimg adolescence, 
which may be followed by adult criminal behavior (Farrington, 1997)'. Also, 
association with others who engage in criminal or other anti-social belhavior ("deviant 
peers") can follow the same pattern. A theoretical question arises froim this trend: 
What causes this stability? Is stability in criminal behavior due to an «enduring 
personality trait, or is it due to enduring social factors? 
The Figure 2 model shows same-time correlation between devuant peer 
association and illegal behavior first during grade 7, next during grade 10, and then 
during the third year after high school. Positive relationships of this k:ind are fairly 
easy to obtain in research, but they are really only enough to raise questions as to the 
causal direction between the two. Research suggests both "social causation" and 
"social selection" effects (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Kandel, 199*6; Laub and 
Sampson, 1993), as depicted by the paths denoted "A" and "B" in the figure 2 model. 
Both make sense in explaining correlation between delinquency and paeers; children 
may choose their friends but are also subject to the influence of their friends 
(Sampson and Laub, 2001b). Path A helps explain deviant peer stability. Perhaps 
through peer influence and increased availability of opportunities to emgage in 
delinquency, the chances of engaging in criminal behavior are increased by virtue of 
"hanging out" with friends who engage in criminal behavior (social camsation). 
Subsequently, those who engage in criminal behavior may develop a p reference 
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toward others who engage in criminal behavior (social selection). Inversely, deviant 
peer association may mediate between prior and later deviant behavior (Kaplan, 
Johnson, and Bailey, 1987). Path B helps explain criminal behavior stability. Youth 
who engage in delinquency may possess a preference toward others who do the same, 
who then influence them to engage in further criminal behavior (Simons et al., 1998). 
Thus, it is possible that criminal behavior and deviant peer association help sustain 
each other over time. However, another question might be asked: What part do social 
control institutions play in maintaining stability in deviant behavior and peer 
associations? 
Labeling theory may be drawn from to further elaborate on the stability of 
anti-social behavior. Efforts at formal social control may play an important part in 
sustaining "criminal careers." To account for this, criminal justice system 
involvement is added to provide the model to be tested, presented in Figure 3. It may 
be hypothesized that through involvement in the criminal justice system, prior 
delinquency (and deviant peer association) can lead to an increased chance of future 
deviant peer association and criminal behavior. Empirical support for this argument 
would exist if the relationships represented in bold is shown to be significant upon 
their inclusion in the model. 
Path C in Figure 3 is an outline for an argument for a segregation effect of the 
criminal justice system on illegal versus legal behavior. In response to the detection 
of delinquent behavior, representatives of the criminal justice system "define" the law 
violator as delinquent (or some other kind of "label") and base punishment and/or 
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treatment on this definition. Punishment or treatment may include probation, 
involuntary community service, involuntary program participation, house arrest, out-
of-home placement, or short and long term incarceration. This punishment may be 
"non-reintegrative" in that it does not foster participation in mainstream social 
activities that stand as preferred alternatives to criminal activities and, consequently, 
the social ties that increase one's stake in conformity. With less legitimate 
opportunities and lower social control, further criminal activities become a more 
accessible alternative. Once this further criminal behavior is detected by 
representatives of the criminal justice system, the sequence can be repeated. 
Path D in Figure 3 is an outline for an argument for a segregation effect of the 
criminal justice system on deviant versus non-deviant peer association. Here is where 
the model integrates labeling theory with social learning and social control theories. 
Deviant peer association has been shown to explain continuity in deviant behavior. 
For example, Kaplan, Johnson, and Bailey, (1987) found that deviant peer association 
at time 2 mediated between time 1 deviance and time 3 deviance. Path D proposes 
the same relationship (using illegal behavior as a specific measure of deviance), but 
incorporates labeling theory by testing if criminal justice system involvement 
mediates between prior illegal behavior and later deviant peer association. As Kaplan 
et al. (1987) explain, the process of social selection toward deviant peer relationships 
may involve factors other than personal disposition. First, it makes sense that deviant 
peers are also selecting deviant individuals—the person committing deviant acts 
becomes more attractive to deviant peer groups. Second, social support for the 
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person committing deviant behavior is less available from conforming peers but quite 
available from deviant peers. Thus, the deviant individual is drawn to the deviant 
peer group for social support. Third, social sanctions against deviant behavior disrupt 
conventional social bonds and steer individuals toward relationships with deviant 
peers. Through involvement in the criminal justice system, not only do law violators 
become exposed to a higher number of other law violators than they do otherwise, but 
relationships with non-deviant peers are not fostered. Thus, system-involved youth 
do not become integrated with mainstream youth that may have a conforming 
influence upon them, further reducing their ties to mainstream social institutions and 
the effectiveness of social control. Instead, system-involved youth become associated 
with deviant peers who then, according to social learning theory, influence them to 
commit future crime. Complete support for an integration of labeling, control, and 
learning theory will exist, then, if deviant peer association is related to later illegal 
behavior in the Figure 3 model also. 
The Figure 3 model also hypothesizes a direct relationship between deviant 
peer association and criminal justice system involvement. This relationship could 
represent another type of labeling effect. Another way that deviant friends may get a 
person in trouble is that they draw more attention to the person from agents of social 
control. For example, if the police notice that a child is associating with known 
"troublemakers," they might assume the child is also a troublemaker and pay more 
attention to his/her behavior—a sort of "guilt by association" effect. Holding the 
amount of deviant behavior equal, a child who is under more scrutiny stands a greater 
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chance of being caught. Here, knowledge of one's deviant peer associations may be 
used as information to define one as deviant. 
Although my theoretical interest is labeling theory, my analysis will also serve 
as a test of some basic propositions drawn from contrasting theoretical perspectives— 
social learning (independent of an integration with labeling theory), social control, 
and rational choice/deterrence. It would be important to note if the results of an 
empirical model support competing theoretical propositions more than those made 
from labeling theory. An etiological question still stands as a very important one in 
criminological study: Can kids get into trouble with delinquency because they "fall in 
with the bad crowd," or do delinquents simply choose to hang out with other kids 
who are like them (or both)? 
The Figure 3 model also proposes that deviant peer association lead to illegal 
behavior—a social causation hypothesis. As I mentioned previously, some studies 
find significant positive relationships between these two variables in the specified 
direction. According to social learning theories, children may learn deviant norms, 
values, beliefs, and behaviors through interaction with primary social groups, 
including groups of delinquent friends. This general proposition is evident in theories 
such as Sutherland and Cressey's differential association, Akers and Burgess' social 
learning theory of differential reinforcement, and Matza and Sykes' neutralization 
theories (Akers, 2000). Deviant peers may impact the delinquent's behavior by 
providing the "know-how" to commit crime, social support absent from mainstream 
peer groups, or "peer pressure" to conform to expectations to commit deviant acts. 
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According to Kaplan, Johnson, and Bailey (1987), associations with deviant peers 
may impact later deviance because they facilitate the deviant behavior of motivated 
offenders, provide rewards for offenders, and disrupt internal and external controls 
from inhibiting deviance. The model will support social learning theory if a 
significant positive relationship between prior deviant peer association and later 
illegal behavior is found. 
The Figure 3 model also proposes that illegal behavior leads to deviant peer 
association (directly and indirectly)—a social selection hypothesis. As I also 
mentioned previously, some studies find significant positive relationships between the 
two in this direction. We might expect social control theories to posit this path more 
than the social causation path, especially Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) "general 
theory of crime." It may be proposed that youth that acquire a propensity to commit 
anti-social behavior during early childhood—"low self-control" for example—also 
develop a preference to associate with others like them. These youth do not develop 
close ties with persons engaging in pro-social behavior. Illegal behavior, then, is a 
behavioral manifestation of low self-control more than an outcome of deviant peer 
influence. As Kaplan, Johnson, and Bailey (1987: 279) explain, a "disposition to 
deviance" may lead to association with deviant peers because they "(1) represent the 
repudiation of the conventional norms that were the source of self-perceived rejection 
and failure, and/or (2) provide the opportunities to achieve gratifications (e.g., social 
acceptance) that the individual felt deprived of in conventional groups." If all of this 
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is true, the model should show that prior delinquency predicts deviant peer 
association better than prior deviant peer association predicts delinquency. 
According to rational choice theories of crime, punishment deters crime. 
Punishing offenders carries with it a symbolic threat to any members of the 
community who may potentially commit crime, and, presumably, a concrete threat to 
persons who have actually offended (Akers, 2000). We may suppose that punishment 
delivered by criminal justice agencies gives individuals good reasons to avoid 
committing criminal acts. Two possible deterrence hypotheses may be considered. 
First, if I find that criminal justice system involvement is negatively related to future 
delinquency/crime, I will support deterrence theory. Since it is fairly well known that 
persons incarcerated in correctional facilities often recidivate, it would be no surprise 
if I failed to find this relationship. However, secondly, proponents of punishment 
may assert that the reason system-involved persons recidivate, or continue into 
criminal careers, is that the punishment administered by criminal justice agencies is 
not strong enough to be a deterrent. Formal efforts at punishment may constitute a 
"slap on the wrist," especially with regard to juvenile offenders. The claim here is 
that criminal justice system involvement has no effect on criminal behavior. 
Therefore, if I do not find relationships between criminal justice system involvement 
and future delinquency/crime, negative or positive, I still may see support for 
deterrence theory. 
Reasoning further, findings of positive relationships between criminal justice 
system involvement and future delinquency/crime would be difficult to explain with 
88 
rational choice theories because they may mean that system involvement does have 
an impact. An important implication may be drawn from such a finding—that not 
only does system involvement fail to deter crime, but it also makes crime worse. 
Such an implication is inconsistent with a pure rational choice approach to crime and 
punishment, while entirely consistent with a labeling approach. Positive relationships 
here would suggest that something more than rational choice on the part of the 
chronic system-involved offender is taking place. 
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METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection Procedure 
An analysis of the proposed models requires the use of longitudinal data that 
measures criminal behavior, deviant peer association, and criminal justice system 
involvement from childhood to early adulthood. Survey data collected by Ronald L. 
Simons and his colleagues as part of the Iowa Youth and Families Project (Simons et 
al., 1998) fit this requirement. This analysis uses all four waves of the IYFP as well 
as three waves of further data collected (on the same sample of children) as part of the 
"Transitions Project." The IYFP is a panel study concerned with the life course 
trajectories of 451 two-parent families. They were recruited through the cohort of all 
male and female seventh grade students enrolled in public or private schools in eight 
counties in north central Iowa during winter and spring, 1989. Another criterion for 
inclusion in the study was the presence of a sibling within four years of age of the 
target seventh-grader. Slightly less than half of the cohort had families meeting these 
criteria. 78% of the eligible families agreed to participate agreed to participate in the 
study. Participating families received $250 at each wave. 
The families in the sample lived either on farms or in small towns. They are 
all white and their annual incomes ranged from 0 to $135,000 (mean = $29,642). 
Fathers' education ranged from 8 to 20 years of education (mean =13.5 years); 
mothers' ranged from 8 to 18 years (mean = 13.4 years). Fathers ranged in age from 
31 to 68 (median = 40); mothers ranged from 29 to 53 (median = 38). Because 
families of less than four were excluded from the sampling frame, the families in the 
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study are larger on average than would be expected from a general population survey. 
Family size ranged from 4 to 13 members with an average of about 5 members. 
Part of the data collection for the IYFP involved annual visits by interviewers 
to each family during each of the four waves (when the target child was in grades 7-
10). Each family member—the target child, father, mother, and sibling—completed a 
set of questionnaires focusing upon family processes, individual family member 
characteristics, and socio-economic circumstances. On average, it took about two 
hours to complete this visit. Further data was collected on the target subjects via 
questionnaires administered in ten waves as part of the Transitions Project. 424 of 
the original 451 families participated in the second wave in 1990, 407 participated in 
the third wave in 1991, and 404 participated in the fourth in 1992. 426 of the original 
families participated in the first transition wave in 1994, 422 participated in the 
second transition wave in 1995, and 429 participated in the third (only the first three 
transition waves will be used in this analysis). 
Since it is my intent to help explain youth crime continuity, I must find such a 
pattern in the data before proceeding with the analysis. Specifically, I must find 
delinquency at time 1 to be related to delinquency at time 3, which is then related to 
adult crime at time 5, as exhibited in the model to be tested (Figure 3). There was no 
continuity in illegal behavior among the females in the sample. In fact, they reported 
very low involvement in delinquent behavior. This continuity was present among 
males, however. Thus, it is necessary that the analysis be restricted to a male sample. 
The final sample to be analyzed consists of 153 target males who provided complete 
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questionnaire data during each of the four IYFP waves as well as follow-up 
questionnaires from the first three Transition waves. 
Analytic Strategy 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) will be used to test the model in Figure 3. 
Since research suggests that lower SES youth are more susceptible to labeling 
processes than higher SES youth (Matsueda, 1992; Sampson, 1986; Sampson and 
Laub, 1997), family SES will be considered as a possible control. Since the sample is 
fairly class homogenous, a relationship between family SES and the model variables 
will be examined. An accounting of family SES in the models will be contingent 
upon statistically significant relationships between family SES and the model 
variables. Variables in the model will be analyzed in temporal progression. The 
model begins with deviant peer association and delinquency during 7th grade (Wave 
A of the IYFP data set). Next, criminal justice system involvement during 8th and 9th 
grade (Waves B and C combined) is added. Next, deviant peer association and 
delinquency during 10th grade (Wave D) is added. Next, criminal justice system 
involvement during 12th grade and the first year out of high school (Transitions 
Waves 1 and 2 combined) is added. Finally, deviant peer association and adult crime 
during the second year out of high school (Transitions Wave 4) are added as outcome 
variables. 
Measures 
Family Socio-Economic Status. Mothers and Fathers were asked to report the 
highest grade of education they had completed. Responses were coded as 00 = 
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Kindergarten or none; actual number up to 12th grade; 13 = 1 year of college, 
vocational, or technical training; 14 = 2 years of college, associate degree; 15 = 3 
years of college, 16 = B. S., B. A.; 17 = Bachelor's plus; 18 = M. S., M. A.; 19 = 
Master's plus; 20 = Ph.D., J. D., D. D. S., M. D., D. V. M., etc.. Fathers' education 
levels ranged from 8-20, with a median of 13. Mothers' education levels ranged from 
9-18, also with a median of 13. The levels for both parents were combined to provide 
total parents' years of education. They were also asked to report the actual amount of 
family income they received during the previous year from ail sources. Family 
incomes ranged from $-308.00-$ 176,000, with a median of $34,662. The correlation 
between parents' education and family income was .398 (p < .001, 2-tailed test). 
Parents' years of education and family income were each standardized and then 
summed to form a composite measure of family SES. 
Deviant Peers. Respondents self-reported their association with deviant peers 
using an instrument adapted from the National Youth Survey (Elliot et al., 1985, 
1989). They were asked how many of their close friends (1 = none, 2 = few, 3 = half, 
4 = most, 5 = all) had engaged in each of 15 delinquent acts during the last year. 
These acts varied from relatively minor offenses, such as skipping school, to more 
serious violations, such as stealing something worth more than $25 (see the Appendix 
for a list of the questionnaire items). Responses to these items were summed to 
obtain a total score concerning the extent to which the respondents' peers engage in 
deviant behavior. 15 items were also used to measure adult deviant peer associations, 
although the acts were slightly different to accommodate adulthood (see Appendix). 
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The Cronbach reliability coefficients were .72 for the time 1 measure, .83 for time 3, 
and .91 for time 5. 
Delinquency/Crime. Respondents self-reported their illegal behavior using a 
delinquency checklist adapted from the National Youth Survey (Elliot et al., 1985, 
1989). The instrument asked respondents to indicate whether they had engaged in 
any of 20 delinquent acts during the preceding year. These acts varied from relatively 
minor offenses, such as skipping school, to more serious offenses, such as attacking 
someone with a weapon, selling drugs, or stealing something worth more than $25 
(see the Appendix for a list of the questionnaire items). An ordinal response format 
(0 = Never; 1 = Once; 2 = 2-3 times; 3 = 4-5 times; 4 = 6 or more times) was used for 
each item, and responses to these items were summed to obtain a total score 
concerning the extent to which respondents engaged in a wide variety of illegal acts. 
For adults, crime was measured differently, using only 12 items (see Appendix). The 
number of acts was reduced largely because of the omission of status offenses. The 
same ordinal scale was used for adults. The Cronbach reliability coefficients were 
.61 for the time 1 measure, .76 for time 3, and .67 for time 5. 
Criminal Justice System Involvement. Respondents self-reported their 
involvement with the criminal justice system using three items adapted from the 
National Youth Survey (Elliot et al., 1985, 1989). Respondents were asked to 
indicate how often during the preceding year they had been arrested, been placed in 
juvenile detention or jail, or gone to court or been placed on probation for something 
they had done (see the Appendix for a list of the questionnaire items). An ordinal 
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response format (0 = Never; 1 = Once; 2 = 2-3 times; 3 = 4-5 times; 4 = 6 or more 
times) was used for each item, and responses to these items were summed to obtain a 
total score concerning the extent to which respondents became involved in the 
criminal justice system. Criminal justice system involvement was measured across a 
two-year period, repeating the above items over two waves. This resulted in a 6-item 
scale for the time 2 measure (waves 2 and 3). The court or probation item was 
available for wave 5 but not for wave 6. Thus, the repeated (time 4) criminal justice 
system measure consisted of 5 items. 
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RESULTS 
To begin, family socioeconomic status was correlated with each of the 
variables in the Figure 3 model. Only one relationship was found. Family SES was 
significantly correlated with time 4 criminal justice system involvement (-0.171) at 
the .05 level (2-tailed test). This result reveals that family SES has an unimportant 
impact upon the hypothesized relationships. Thus, it will not be included in the 
analysis as a control. 
At times 1, 3, and 5, all of the target males reported some level of association 
with deviant peers. At time 1 (wave 1), their deviant peer association scores ranged 
from 15 to 34, with a mean score of 19.1. Three years later at time 3 (wave 4), their 
scores ranged from 15 to 47 and the mean rose to 20.93. At time 5 (wave 7), the adult 
deviant peer association (measured slightly different) scores ranged from 15 to 45, 
with a mean of 22.48. 
At time 1 (wave 1), 74 (48.37%) of the target boys reported some level of 
delinquency. Targets' delinquency scores ranged from 0 to 14, with a mean score of 
1.81. Three years later at time 3 (wave 4) the number of boys reporting some level of 
delinquency rose to 104 (67.97%). Targets' scores at this time ranged from 0 to 28, 
and the mean rose to 3.48. At time 5 (wave 7), 113 reported some level of adult 
crime. Targets' adult crime (measured differently) scores at this time ranged from 0 
to 22, with a mean of 4.37. 
At time 2 (waves 2 and 3), 23 (15.03%) of the target boys reported some level 
of involvement with the criminal justice system. Of those who reported involvement, 
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16 reported one confrontation with authorities within the two-year period, 4 reported 
two, and 3 reported three. Three years later at time 4 (waves 5 and 6) the number of 
targets reporting some level of criminal justice system involvement rose to 61 
(39.87%). Targets' criminal justice system involvement scores at this time ranged 
from 0 to 9, with a mean score of 1.01. 
Table 1 presents the correlations, means, standard deviations, and ranges of 
the study variables and family socio-economic status. Deviant peer association is 
abbreviated "dpeer," delinquency is abbreviated "delin," "crime" refers to the adult 
measure of illegal behavior, criminal justice system involvement is abbreviated 
"sysinv," and family socio-economic status is abbreviated "famses." The variables 
are designated by time period; for example, "T1 dpeer" refers to deviant peer 
association at time 1. 
Table 1. Correlations, means, standard deviations, and ranges of variables 
T1dpeer T3doeer TSdneer Tldelin T3delin TScrime T2svsinv T4svsinv Famses 
TIdpeer 
T3dpeer 
TSdpeer 
TI delin 
".275 
".287 
".502 
".526 
".400 ".295 
T3delin ".263 "719 ".508 ".469 — 
TScrime ".294 ".370 ".533 ".270 ".434 — 
T2sysinv *.169 ".349 ".173 ".379 ".384 .117 — 
T4sysinv .121 '.193 ".255 ".345 ".327 "291 .155 — 
Famses -.107 -.158 -.130 -.094 -.151 -.153 -.090 *-.171 — 
Mean 19.105 20.935 22.477 1.811 3.477 4.373 0.216 1.013 0.141 
S. D. 3.827 5.547 6.337 2.769 4.934 4.972 0.584 1.713 1.621 
Ran se 15-34 15-47 15-45 0-14 0-28 0-22 0-3 0-9 -3.2-5.5 
N = 153 *p < .05 * p < .001 (2-taiIed test) 
97 
Standardized path coefficients were obtained through structural equation 
modeling using the Amos 4 computer program. The model is presented in Figure 4. 
With regard to goodness-of-fit, the model had a chi-square of 18.33 (DF = 9; p = 
.032.), a GFI of .97, and an AGFI of .87. For the sake of parsimony, a second model 
was run excluding paths with t-values less than 1. These paths were time one deviant 
peer association to time 2 system involvement, time 3 deviant peer association to time 
4 system involvement, and time 1 deviant peer association to time 3 delinquency. 
This model is presented in Figure 5. The reduced model did not result in formerly 
insignificant relationships becoming significant (or vice versa). The path coefficients 
and t-values for both models are displayed in Table 2. With regard to goodness-of-fit, 
the reduced model had a chi-square of 19.35 (DF = 12; p = .081), a GFI of .97, and an 
AGFI of .91. The difference in chi-squares between the two models (1.02; DF = 3) is 
insignificant at the .10 level. 
To begin, Figure 5 shows that there is no significant path from time 1 deviant 
peer association to time 3 deviant peer association, but there is a significant path from 
time 3 deviant peer association to time 5 deviant peer association (.34). Thus, 
continuity in deviant peer relationships was restricted to the period between time 3 
and time 5. There was, however, continuity in illegal behavior across the span of the 
model. Time 1 delinquency was associated with time 3 delinquency (.38), which was 
then associated with time 5 crime (.28). 
Figure 5 shows the following positive correlations: time 1 deviant peer 
association and time 1 delinquency (.50), the error terms for time 3 deviant peer 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
e 
Deviant 
Peers 
Deviant 
Peers 
,03 .23 .04 .14 
System 
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Figure 4. Full structural equation model 
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Figure 5. Reduced structural equation model 
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Table 2. Path coefficients and t-values 
Full Model Reduced Model 
Path Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value 
T1 dpeer ^ —>Tldelin .50 5.53 .50 5.53 
T3dpeer^—>T3delin .63 6.61 .64 6.61 
TSdpeer^—^TScrime .38 4.37 .38 4.37 
T ldpeer~>T3dpeer .11 1.27 .08 1.21 
T1 dpeer~> T2s ys i n v -.03 -0.32 — — 
Tldpeer~^T3 delin .04 0.54 — — 
TldeIin-^T3dpeer .26 2.91 .27 3.24 
Tldelin-^T2sysinv .39 4.53 .38 5.05 
TldeIin->T3delin .36 4.18 .38 5.05 
T2sysinv->T3dpeer .23 3.01 .23 3.00 
T2sysinv->T3delin .24 3.23 .24 3.21 
T3dpeer~>T5dpeer .34 3.56 .34 3.57 
T3dpeer~^T4sysinv -.09 -0.79 — — 
T3dpeer->T5crime .14 1.32 .14 1.32 
T3delin->T5dpeer .22 2.24 .22 2.27 
T3delin-^T4sysinv .39 3.54 .33 4.27 
T3deIin->T5crime .28 2.61 .28 2.65 
T4sysinv->T5dpeer .12 1.63 .12 1.63 
T4svsinv->T5crime .17 2.28 .17 2.29 
association and time 3 delinquency (.64), and the error terms for time 5 deviant peer 
association and time 5 crime (.38). These results do not distinguish support for either 
social control or social learning theory, as the related variables are not temporally 
ordered. However, they were temporally ordered elsewhere in the model. There 
were no significant paths from time 1 deviant peer association to time 3 delinquency 
or from time 3 deviant peer association to time 5 crime. Thus, no social causation 
relationships were found and social learning theory was not supported here. On the 
other hand, time 1 delinquency was associated with time 3 deviant peer association 
(.27) and time 3 delinquency was associated with time 5 deviant peer association 
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(.22). With these apparent social selection relationships, social control theory 
receives support here. 
In Figure 5, system involvement played an important part in a path significant 
across all waves. Time 1 delinquency was associated with time 2 system involvement 
(.38), which was associated with time 3 delinquency (.24). Thus, time 2 system 
involvement mediated the relationship between time 1 and time 3 delinquency. The 
indirect effect of time 1 delinquency on time 3 delinquency due to time 2 system 
involvement is .091 (.38 x .24), which accounts for 19.4% of the zero-order 
correlation between time 1 and time 3 delinquency (.469; see Table 1). Next, time 3 
delinquency was associated with time 4 system involvement (.33), which was 
associated with time 5 crime (.17). Thus, time 4- system involvement mediated 
between time 3 delinquency and time 5 crime. The indirect effect of time 3 
delinquency on time 5 crime due to time 4 criminal justice system involvement is 
.056 (.33 x .17), which accounts for 13% of the zero-order correlation between time 3 
delinquency and time 5 crime (.434; see Table 1). These results support the basic 
proposition of labeling theory and contradict rational choice and deterrence theories. 
Further, time 2 system involvement was associated with time 3 deviant peer 
association (.23), and time 4 system involvement was weakly associated with time 5 
deviant peer association (.12; p < .06). Thus, time 2 system involvement mediated 
the relationship between time 1 delinquency and time 3 deviant peer association, and 
time 4 system involvement slightly mediated between time 3 delinquency and time 5 
deviant peer association. The indirect effect of time 1 delinquency on time 3 deviant 
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peer association due to time 2 system involvement is .087 (.38 x .23), which accounts 
for 22% of the zero-order correlation between time 1 delinquency and time 3 deviant 
peer association (.400; see Table 1). The indirect effect of time 3 delinquency on 
time 5 deviant peer association due to time 4 system involvement is .04 (.33 x .12), 
which accounts for 8% of the zero-order correlation between time 3 delinquency and 
time 5 deviant peer association (.508; see Table 1). These results support the social 
segregation argument made in labeling theory. However, since deviant peer 
association and further illegal behavior were not associated in the model, a 
labeling/learning theory hybrid received incomplete support. 
Finally, the model did not offer support for the proposition that one may be 
labeled via association with deviant peers (a "guilt-by-association" effect). Time 1 
deviant peer association was not associated with time 2 system involvement, and time 
3 deviant peer association was not associated with time 4 system involvement. 
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DISCUSSION 
Interpretation of Results 
Stewart et al. (2001) also supported labeling theory using the IYFP data, 
finding that "legal sanctions" at "time 2" amplified the positive relationship between 
"time 1" and "time 3" delinquency. The focus of their analysis was on showing that 
legal sanctions play a large part in promoting poor parenting practices, and they 
accounted for labeling in their model. The model in this analysis differs from theirs 
in that the focus is on labeling, the span of labeling effects is extended by two more 
time periods, and the third variable accounted for is deviant peer association. My 
findings are, of course, consistent with those of Stewart et al. (2001). 
Consistent with prior research, this analysis found continuity in illegal 
behavior. Delinquency during grade 7 was positively related to delinquency during 
grade 10, which was then positively related to crime three years after high school. 
Thus, the empirical groundwork for studying factors related to criminal continuity 
was established. The next task was to examine how criminal justice system 
involvement, along with deviant peer relationships, help explain this continuity. 
Continuity in deviant peer association was not found across the entire span of 
the model. Deviant peer association during grade 7 was not significantly related to 
deviant peer association at grade 10, but deviant peer association at grade 10 was 
positively related to deviant peer association three years after high school. The 
change in the strength of the relationship between the two time periods is actually 
somewhat striking (.08 compared to .34). It is interesting to note that prior deviant 
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peer association was not related to later deviant peer association until after criminal 
justice system involvement during grades 8 and 9 (which was positively related to 
deviant peer association at grade 10). This finding may suggest that criminal justice 
system sanctions may help to solidify deviant peer relationships. Also, the finding 
may indicate a developmental difference. Deviant peer stability from junior high to 
early high school may not have been found because children did not proceed 
completely enough from one stage of institutional social control—largely, that 
involving the family—to the next—that involving high school, peers, and for some, 
the criminal justice system. 
Relatively impressive correlations between deviant peer association and 
illegal behavior were found at all three time periods—grade 7, grade 10, and three 
years after high school. These findings are also quite consistent with prior research. 
Since these are same-time correlations, there is no support for arguing a causal 
direction between the two, or in favor of a particular theory of crime. However, these 
variables were temporally ordered elsewhere in the analysis for the purpose of 
making theoretical arguments. 
Results did not support a social causation argument explaining the relationship 
between deviant peer association and illegal behavior. According to social learning 
theories such as differential association, neutralization, and differential reinforcement, 
deviant peer groups provide individuals with the means and support to commit 
deviant acts. Accordingly, this analysis examined the hypothesis that prior deviant 
peer group membership is positively related to later illegal behavior. Deviant peer 
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association during grade 7 was not significantly related to delinquency during grade 
10, and deviant peer association during grade 10 was not significantly related to crime 
three years after high school. Thus, this analysis failed to show that that relationships 
with deviant peer groups lead to individual offending. In this analysis, support for 
social causation would have required that deviant peer groups have an influence on 
individuals' behavior three: years later. Perhaps a closer temporal ordering between 
the two variables would result in a significant effect of deviant peer groups on 
individuals' illegal behavior. 
This analysis did sispport a social selection argument regarding the 
relationship between deviamt peer association and illegal behavior. According to 
control theories such as Go»ttfredson and Hirschi's (1990) theory of low self-control, 
anti-social children with pernor bonds with conforming individuals develop a 
preference to associate with other anti-social children. Of course, a more precise test 
of this theoretical approach, would involve some kind of measure of anti-social 
tendency or low self-controel. This kind of a measure was not included in this 
analysis, but if social selection were to take place, we should expect illegal behavior 
to predict deviant peer asso-ciation better than vice versa. Accordingly, this analysis 
examined the hypothesis that prior illegal behavior is positively related to later 
deviant peer association. Delinquency during grade 7 was positively related to 
deviant peer association during grade 10, and delinquency during grade 10 was 
positively related to deviant! peer association three years after high school. Thus, it 
appeared that the youth in tliis sample strengthened their association with deviant 
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peers after committing illegal acts. It would be interesting to see if contact with the 
criminal justice system amplified this relationship. 
The focus of this study was to examine outcomes of youths' contact with 
agents of the criminal justice system. First, a rational choice/deterrence argument 
regarding the relationship between criminal justice system involvement and future 
deviant behavior was not supported in this analysis. According to deterrence theories 
of criminal punishment, sanctions delivered by agents of the criminal justice system 
are somehow painful to the offender and give the offender good reason to avoid 
offending in the future. Accordingly, two hypotheses were entertained. First, if 
offenders respond to punishment "rationally," then prior criminal justice system 
involvement should be negatively related to later illegal behavior, as well as deviant 
peer association. Second, accommodating popular accusations that criminal justice 
system sanctions are often too lenient, one might argue that a failure to find a 
deterrence effect is reconcilable with deterrence theory. Then, there would be no 
relationship between prior criminal justice system involvement and later illegal 
behavior and deviant peer association. 
Findings contradict both hypotheses. First, delinquency during grade 7 was 
positively related to criminal justice system involvement during grades 8 and 9, and 
delinquency during grade 10 was positively related to criminal justice system 
involvement during grade 12 and the first year after high school. This finding simply 
supports the idea that committing illegal acts increases the likelihood that youth will 
get into trouble with the law. More relevant to deterrence theory are the findings that 
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criminal justice system involvement during grades 8 and 9 was positively related to 
delinquency during grade 10, and criminal justice system involvement during grade 
12 and the first year after high school was positively related to crime during the third 
year after high school. Thus, not only were the youth in this sample not deterred 
much by their criminal justice system involvement, they actually increased their 
deviant behavior following it. 
Since criminal justice system involvement was positively related to later 
illegal behavior, in two phases, this analysis offers support for labeling theory. 
According to labeling theory, powerful individuals, groups, organizations, or 
segments of society define certain behavior, and the individuals committing the 
behavior, as somehow offensive. These individuals are subsequently treated as 
deviant, largely in a punitive way so as to deter future deviance. In doing this, agents 
of social control socially differentiate "deviants" from "conformists," retaining social 
privileges for the conformists and denying them to the deviants. Thus, "labeled" 
persons become stigmatized and segregated from the mainstream community, 
resulting in an increased likelihood that the person defined as deviant will continue 
engaging in deviant behavior. All of this considered, it could be hypothesized that 
prior illegal behavior will be positively related to later criminal justice system 
involvement, and that criminal justice system involvement will be positively related 
to later illegal behavior. The structural equation model (Figure 5) revealed a path 
significant across the entire span of the model that may be seen as support for the 
general contention of labeling theory. Youth engaging in illegal behavior in early 
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junior high school tended to be system-involved by early high school, which 
increased the likelihood that they would engage in illegal behavior again later in high 
school. The path continued—repeat offenders during high school tended to be 
system-involved by their first year out of high school, which increased the likelihood 
that they would commit crime in early adulthood. 
As discussed previously, this analysis found that youth increased their deviant 
peer association after committing illegal acts. Additionally, youth increased their 
deviant peer association after involvement with the criminal justice system. The 
process of defining and reacting to individuals as deviant results in their segregation 
away from conforming others and toward relationships with deviant others. Through 
these relationships, one is provided with increased opportunity and motivation to 
commit further deviance, and may even come to socially identify with deviant peer 
groups. With this in mind, it makes sense to integrate labeling theory with social 
learning theory, as there appears to be some overlap between the two. This analysis 
tested the hypothesis that prior criminal justice system involvement would be 
positively related to later deviant peer association. Criminal justice system 
involvement during grades 8 and 9 was positively related to deviant peer association 
during grade 10, and criminal justice system involvement during grade 12 and the 
first year after high school was weakly positively related to deviant peer association, 
during the third year after high school. Thus, it appears that criminal justice system 
involvement may facilitate law-breaking individuals' preference to associate with 
deviant appears. However, since deviant peer association was not shown to predict 
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further illegal behavior, the results did not completely support a labeling/learning 
theory hybrid. 
This analysis did not reveal a "guilt by association" labeling effect. 
Consistent with labeling theory, it may be proposed that "hanging out" with peers that 
are known to engage in illegal behavior increases one's exposure to law enforcement 
authorities, and these relationships may be used as cues in defining one as deviant. 
Police, for instance, may "be on the look-out" for kids who are "running with the 
wrong crowd." This analysis tested the hypothesis that deviant peer association 
would be positively related to criminal justice system involvement. Deviant peer 
association during grade 7 was not significantly related to criminal justice system 
involvement during grades 8 and 9, and deviant peer association during grade 10 was 
not significantly related to criminal justice system involvement during grade 12 and 
the first year after high school. In this sample, it did not appear that having friends 
who engage in illegal behavior was enough, in itself, to increase one's chances of 
getting into trouble with the law. 
Lastly, these results indicated that criminal justice involvement has mediating 
effects. Generally, labeling theory posits a mediating relationship: deviant behavior 
at some point will lead to societal reaction to suppress it, which will then bring about 
more deviant behavior. Thus, it may be hypothesized that prior deviance is indirectly 
related to later deviance through societal reaction. Two labeling arguments involving 
mediation were supported in the Figure 5 model. First, in addition to being directly 
related, prior and later illegal behavior was indirectly related through criminal justice 
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system involvement twice. Time 2 system involvement explained 19.4% of the 
relationship between time 1 and time 3 delinquency, and time 4 system involvement 
explained 13% of the relationship between time 3 delinquency and time 5 crime. 
This path supports the general causal relationship proposed in labeling theory. 
Second, in addition to being directly related, prior delinquency and later deviant peer 
association was also indirectly related through system involvement. Time 2 system 
involvement explained 22% of the relationship between time 1 delinquency and time 
3 deviant peer association, although time 4 system only explained 8% of the 
relationship between time 3 delinquency and time 5 deviant peer association. This 
path supports the labeling argument that sanctions have a way of segregating 
individuals away from conforming peers and toward deviant peers. A model 
summarizing all of the relationships that were found in this study is presented in 
Figure 6. 
While these results suggest that criminal justice system involvement help to 
explain chronic criminal behavior, they also obviously show that the part it plays is 
very limited. The indirect effects produced by system involvement are not heavily 
incriminating. Most of the criminal continuity in the analysis is left unexplained. 
Based on these results, it may be argued that there are other factors explaining most 
of the relationship between prior and later crime. There could be other environmental 
factors or personality or "latent traits" that could account for the rest of this 
relationship. Also, system involvement could interact with these other factors in 
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developmental processes to produce criminal continuity. In any case, holding the 
criminal justice system solely responsible for re-offending seems to be unwarranted. 
Limitations of this study stem from the fact that such a narrowly defined 
sample was studied. The sample consisted of rural white males from two-parent 
families who share about the same social class. Consequently, results here cannot be 
generalized to other populations. The results of this study should be viewed in 
relation to studies done using samples of other populations. It would have been 
desirable to make comparisons across social categories in this study, as we would 
expect illegal behavior and labeling effects to vary according to race and ethnicity, 
class, and sex/gender. For example, the positive association between criminal justice 
system involvement and illegal behavior may have be stronger for racial and ethnic 
minorities, while it may be weaker or non-existent for (white) middle class youth. 
Unfortunately, the existing data set used in this study did not allow for most of these 
comparisons, and the females in the sample did not exhibit the criminal continuity 
needed to conduct the analysis. Examining gender interactions with labeling is 
needed to see if control agents are at times less likely to label females, due to some 
form of chivalry, while at other times are more likely to label them, as may be the 
case with deviant sexual behavior (such as prostitution). However, the results of this 
analysis are consistent with the way labeling theory would predict young 
lower/working class males to behave. The strength of this study lies in that it shows 
that it is possible to increase some youth's illegal behavior by formally sanctioning it. 
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Another limitation stems from the measure of criminal justice system 
involvement used in this analysis. The measure detected only a few types of light to 
moderate involvement with the criminal justice system: getting arrested, going to 
detention or jail, and going to court or being placed on probation. More non-
reintegrative types of sanctioning—those that should show the strongest labeling 
effects, such as long-term incarceration, were not included in this measure. Further, 
the sample reported very little involvement, especially for the time 2 measure. On the 
other hand, it seems rather impressive that despite these measurement limitations, this 
study found that youth increased their illegal behavior after even light trouble with 
the law. It might be supposed that more serious involvement with the criminal justice 
system would have a greater impact on continued illegal behavior. 
Also, there is more than one possible interpretation of the results of this study. 
The data show that youth increased their illegal behavior after contact with the 
criminal justice system. While most labeling theorists would expect this relationship, 
they offer many different avenues as to how contact with social control agents create 
deviance. The data does not make it clear why system involvement is followed by 
more crime or exactly who is responsible, nor does it offer conclusive evidence that 
labeling, per se, is even taking place. We cannot assume that since system 
involvement is statistically related to future illegal behavior, it must be the one 
"sticking" the deviant label on individuals. Consistent with statements made earlier 
by theorists such as Becker (1973), Erikson (1964), and Kituse (1964), it may be the 
community outside of the criminal justice system—families, friends, neighbors, 
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school, etc., that responds to facilitate continued crime on the part of individuals. 
Further, this analysis did not include more precise societal reaction variables that 
would indicate that labeling is indeed taking place. These might include individuals' 
actual experiences while involved with the system, incarceration records, definitions 
of them made by community members, or observable behavioral reactions to them. 
Some of this data would have to be gathered using qualitative research methods. 
Suggestions for Future Theory and Research 
The empirical analysis in this study is limited in that it does not tell us "why" 
criminal justice system is positively related to later illegal behavior. The criminal 
justice system involvement measure used in this analysis dealt with relatively minor 
confrontations with the law. More research is needed to expose the relative predictive 
power of more specific legal sanctions. For example, it may be true that certain types 
of societal reactions to deviance put offenders at higher risk for re-offending, not 
sanctioning deviant behavior in general. Labeling research may be used to find out 
which sanctions reduce crime and which ones increase it. 
This analysis was successful in supporting propositions from labeling theory 
using longitudinal data spanning across developmental stages—from late 
childhood/early adolescence (junior high school) to recent high school graduate (early 
adulthood). This is further cause to propose that labeling theory may be conceptually 
improved by incorporating a life-course perspective. In particular, propositions 
drawn from Sampson and Laub's (1997) life course theory of cumulative 
disadvantage should be more thoroughly tested. The present study only begins to test 
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a life course labeling theory by using longitudinal data to examine the relationship 
between criminal justice system involvement and crime across different stages of 
youth. A more thorough model would include separate measures of legitimate 
opportunities, social bonds, and perhaps even "self-control." These are the variables 
Sampson and Laub (1997) use to explain why formal and informal sanctions lead to 
future deviant behavior. In Figure 7,1 present a conceptual model that I believe 
would serve as a basis for a more thorough test of Sampson and Laub's (1997) 
version of labeling theory. The model summarizes a labeling theory argument that 
focuses on the segregation effects of labeling which operate to mortgage the future of 
those defined and treated as deviant. 
Life course perspectives are used widely within the social sciences, with 
sociology holding a primary focus on the social life course. The perspective focuses 
on the dynamics that evolve over individuals' life spans within specific historical 
contexts. Social changes occurring at some point in history alter the life course of 
individuals (and their age cohorts), and the impact of this relationship is dependent 
upon the developmental stage in life at which individuals experience these changes 
(Elder, 1985). Life course analyses are useful in that they reveal the importance of 
life histories in explaining life outcomes. The perspective draws a connection 
between later and earlier life phases: through knowledge of earlier periods in the life 
course, we come to a better understanding of individuals' behavior and circumstances 
at later ages (Elder, 2001). The life course may be viewed prospectively or 
retrospectively, depending upon analytic strategy (Elder, 1985), and clearly, life 
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Figure 7. An integrated model of labeling theory featuring segregation effects 
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course analyses require the use of longitudinal data. Partington (1997) charges that 
more research on the escalation of individual offending is needed, especially on the 
prediction of offending. The possibility that criminal justice system is a factor in 
escalation may be explored, and a life-course labeling theory would provide a suitable 
framework. 
It is important to understand the key concepts used in the life course 
perspective and how they might apply to an integrated labeling theory. First of all, 
life course is defined in Caspi, Elder, and Herbener (1990: 15) as the "sequence of 
culturally defined agegraded roles and social transitions that are enacted over time." 
Elder (2001: 4-5) defines it as "the interweave of age-graded trajectories, such as 
work careers and family pathways, that are subject to changing conditions and future 
options, and to short-term transitions ranging from leaving school to retirement." 
More generally, "the life course can be viewed as a multi-level phenomenon, ranging 
from structured pathways through social institutions and organizations to the social 
trajectories of individuals and their developmental pathways" (Elder, 2001: 4). The 
concepts of trajectory and transition are used to describe the life course (Thomberry, 
1997). 
Elder (2001: 5) states that a "core premise of life course study" is that 
"developmental processes and outcomes are shaped by the social trajectories that 
people follow, as through advancement and demotion." Trajectories represent 
relatively long time spans in which life course dynamics take place. A trajectory is a 
"line of development over the life span" (Sampson and Laub, 2001: 23). Elder (1985: 
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31) defines a "life trajectory," inclusively, as "a pathway defined by the aging process 
or by movement across the age structure..." regardless of the "...direction, degree, or 
rate of change of its course." Further, "Life trajectories can be charted by linking 
states across successive years" (Elder, 1985: 31), such as states of employment, 
education, or health. According to Thomberry (1997: 4), "Trajectories are long-term, 
age-graded patterns of development in major social institutions such as family, 
education, occupation, and crime." Therefore, as examples, we may speak of 
trajectories of work, marriage, child bearing and rearing, schooling, and even crime. 
Of course, not everyone enters into all trajectories, and some will have more success 
than others might in "accomplishing the developmental tasks that are embedded in the 
trajectories they do enter" (Thomberry, 1997: 4). The concept of trajectory is often 
associated with the study of "careers," without restriction to employment or 
occupational careers (Elder, 1985). Thus, a life-course perspective on crime involves 
analyses of "criminal careers." 
A long-term focus on trajectories involves the connection between childhood 
experiences and adult outcomes, but transitions represent a shorter-term view 
(Sampson and Laub, 2001a). Life transitions mark shorter time spans in which these 
dynamics evolve; they represent an individual's change in state, as in from single to 
married, from employed to unemployed, or becoming incarcerated. Related to the 
concept of transition is the concept of life event. Transitions are activated by more 
specific life events such as starting or graduating college, getting married or divorced, 
and starting or leaving a job (Elder, 1985; Thomberry, 1997). As stated by Elder 
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(1985: 31-32), "Transitions are always embedded in trajectories that give them 
distinctive form and meaning" and "Each trajectory is marked by a sequence of life 
events and transitions, changes in state that are more or less abrupt." Thomberry 
(1997: 4) states that transitions "can deflect the trajectory's arc or growth curve." 
The meaning and implications of a life event and transition depend on when they 
occur within a phase of a particular trajectory, as in some point during young or late 
adulthood for example. [However, it should be noted that not all events are age-
graded, such as unexpected life events (Elder, 1985).] Transitions serve as both the 
result of past processes (as a "dependent variable") and the instigator of new ones (as 
an "independent variable"). In this way, transitions are temporally linked—chains of 
life transitions mark pathways across the life course (Rutter, 1989). With respect to 
labeling theory, a confrontation with an agent of social control serves as a life event 
that disrupts an individual's successful transitions across trajectories such as school 
and employment while helping to direct one along a crime trajectory. 
Also important is the concept of duration. With respect to events and 
transitions, duration refers to the periods of time between changes in state (Elder, 
1985). Depending on the presence of other factors in people's lives, duration, itself, 
has consequences for the life course. For example, prolonged incarceration may 
decrease one's ability to integrate into the community after being released. 
According to Elder (2001: 5), "the life course perspective offers a framework 
for exploring the dynamics of multiple, interdependent pathways" through life. Thus, 
interdependence is a key concept to the perspective. "Interdependence refers to the 
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interlocking nature of trajectories and transitions, within and across life stages. This 
interweave of lifelines may generate turning points or a change in course" (Elder, 
1985: 32). Not only will trajectories such as work, child rearing, and marriage shape 
each other, but they are also interdependent with transitions such as those from school 
to work or from work to retirement (Elder, 1985). Another type of independence 
central to life course study involves interdependent lives, or what Elder (2001) refers 
to as the "principle of linked lives." It is through social relationships, through 
interactions with family, friends, co-workers, etc., that our existence is regulated and 
supported throughout the life span. It is this principle that is especially important to 
social interactional theories of crime such as labeling. 
Transitions and life events may serve as turning points, another concept 
relating to a shorter-term focus within trajectories. Elder (1985: 35) states, "...events 
and transitions modify life trajectories. Some events are important turning points in 
life—they redirect paths." A dependent relationship exists between widely separated 
transitions and between widely separated life events; experiences in one social phase 
are dependent upon the "tempo and character" of earlier phases. For example, the 
ending of a work career may be partly shaped by the way in which the career began. 
Turning points may involve more sudden, discrete life events that significantly 
changes one's life such as the death of a loved one or winning the lottery. However, 
turning points may also involve processes over time that bring about incremental, less 
dramatic changes such as the changes coming about after getting married or finding a 
job (Laub and Sampson, 1993). Experiences with the criminal justice system may 
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serve as a turning point in one's life, which may be relatively sudden and discrete or 
prolonged. Thus, turning points may be used to predict changes in crime, including 
desistance. For example, work by Sampson and Laub has been successful in showing 
that transitions to involvement with informal social control institutions, particularly 
attachment to work and cohesive marriages, seem to discourage criminal behavior, 
independent of differing individual criminal propensities (Laub and Sampson, 1993). 
The timing of life events may be as significant as their mere occurrence. The 
life stage principle holds that the effect changes have on individuals depend on when 
these changes occur in their lives. "Social timing refers to the incidence, duration, 
and sequence of roles, and to relevant expectations and beliefs based on age" (Elder, 
2001: 6). Social meanings are attached to age with regard to when social roles are 
occupied and events are experienced. Off-time events may have dire consequences, 
as when teenage parenthood leads to trouble finding a job and socioeconomic 
disadvantage in adulthood (Elder, 1985; Thomberry, 1997). The timing of multiple 
trajectories also has important consequences with respect to whether they are 
synchronous or not, as is illustrated when couples "juggle" family and work events or 
when children physically mature early or late (Elder, 2001). Not only should we 
expect that the effects of labeling vary according to the life stage at which they occur, 
as an age-graded labeling theory would suggest, but they should also depend on what 
else is going on in an individual's life in other social institutional settings. 
The life course perspective allows for recognition of human agency and 
individual differences. Individuals make choices within environmental constraints 
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that play a major part in selecting future circumstances and constructing their life 
course (Elder, 2001). The way in which people adapt to events serve as the link 
between events and future events and the subsequent life course: "Lines of adaptation 
represent a process of constructing the life course. The same event or transition 
followed by different adaptations can lead to very different trajectories" (Elder, 1985: 
35). Thus, in addition to their occurrence and outcomes, the negotiation of transitions 
must be considered (Rutter, 1989). Some events and turning points act as disruptions 
of individuals' plans for the future life course—as crises. The individual responds 
with efforts to restore control over the course of one's life. With this in mind, the 
individual may be seen as an active agent in shaping one's own trajectories. It is 
important, then, to recognize personal and social resources used in adaptation, or, 
"what they bring to the situation" (Elder, 1985). Rutter (1989) explains that people 
help shape their future social environments through the choices and steps they take 
earlier in life (such as choice of a marriage partner). Caspi, Elder, and Herbener 
(1990) focused on how individuals use interactional styles to meet role demands and 
role changes along the life course and select future situations and environments. 
Individuals may tend to select situations and environments that are compatible with 
their dispositions. They found that ill-temperedness, shyness, and dependency were 
associated with trouble in meeting age-graded role demands and transitions, 
beginning during childhood. In many instances, anti-social behavior—behavior that 
is labeled and punished—may represent maladaptive ways of negotiating transitions 
from home to school to work and so on. 
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Consistent with the life course perspective is the view that what one does at 
some point in life has an effect on what happens later. This is the basic idea behind 
the concept of state dependence—an act or circumstance present at one point in time 
has a direct or an indirect influence on the probability that an act or circumstance will 
exist at a later point in time. Applied to crime, we have the basic idea of labeling 
theory—committing crime at one point determines a higher likelihood that one will 
commit crime later (Sampson and Laub, 2001a). Although the connection between 
past and future crime may be direct, it may also be indirect in that crime disrupts 
individuals' relationships with conforming individuals and mainstream social 
institutions, relationships that may deter them from committing future crime. 
According to Sampson and Laub (2001b: 247), "weak social bonding serves as a 
mediating and hence causal sequential link in a 'chain of adversity' between 
childhood delinquency and adult criminal behavior." 
The connection between past and future behavior may be a matter of 
interactional continuity, whereby behaviors elicit responses from others that ensure 
that these behaviors, or similar ones, will be repeated. For example, consistent with a 
labeling argument, anti-social acts are acts hostile to sanctioning agents such as 
parents, teachers, and law enforcement. Sanctioning agents retaliate with hostility-
punishment, perhaps delivered with anger. In response, the person being sanctioned 
returns the hostility with more anti-social behavior (Caspi, Elder, and Bern, 1987). 
Also, the connection between past and future behavior may be a matter of 
cumulative continuity, whereby one's behavior elicits responses from others that 
124 
determine the availability of future opportunities. For example, again consistent with 
a labeling argument, responses to illegal behavior such as incarceration interferes 
with one's ability to acquire legitimate opportunities such as education or gainful 
employment, thus making illegal activities more likely. Social disadvantages 
accumulate over time to interfere with successful adult development (Moffitt, 1993). 
Sampson and Laub (2001b: 247) write, "The idea of cumulative continuity suggests 
that delinquency incrementally mortgages the future by generating negative 
consequences for life chances, especially among stigmatized and institutionalized 
youth." In other words, crime and its elicited social reactions result in the "knifing 
off' of one's future legitimate opportunities. 
Sampson and Laub (2001b: 247) recognize here that the cumulative continuity 
of disadvantage is also "a result of stable individual differences in criminal 
propensity." To make a state dependence argument in explaining criminal continuity 
is not to deny that population heterogeneity regarding relatively stable individual 
attributes also play a part. Sampson and Laub (2001b: 250) also state, "... 
heterogeneity and state dependence need not be mutually exclusive phenomena— 
both operate over the life-course of individuals." 
Life course perspectives on crime utilize a developmental approach. With 
respect to anti-social behavior, Loeber and Le Blanc (1990: 405) define trajectories as 
"developmental sequences—of activation, aggravation, and desistance—that span more 
than one developmental period of individuals' lives, such as childhood, adolescence, 
and adulthood." As they point out, "Individuals may progress or regress on 
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developmental sequences, but they rarely move through an entire sequence or 
trajectory" (420). Therefore, they define the term "path" as "segments that 
individuals travel along a developmental sequence or trajectory" (420). Consistent 
with the state dependence hypothesis, developmental criminology assumes that these 
paths consist of multiple linear relationships between variables and employs a 
"stepping-stone approach," a wider causal perspective whereby "formerly dependent 
variables may become independent variables over time" (433). The stepping stone 
model "allows the identification of factors that are uniquely associated with particular 
developmental processes of offending and allows specification of the sequence and 
duration of potential causal factors along the developmental time line" (433). The 
"timing" of specific causes is important in that individuals may be vulnerable to them 
during some life phases more than others or when they are present in conjunction 
with other factors. With the stepping-stone approach, factors from different age 
periods are used to predict distal outcomes, and a number of risk factors may be 
combined to jointly predict future delinquency (Loeber and Le Blanc, 1990). 
As Thomberry (1997: 5) states, "Thus, an individual's development can be 
described in terms of the trajectories the person enters, the successful accomplishment 
of developmental tasks in those trajectories, and the timing of transitions along those 
trajectories. In turn, all of these attributes, in multiple trajectories, can be used to 
enhance our understanding of delinquent and criminal behavior." Thomberry (1997) 
recommends that developmental and life-course concepts and perspectives may be 
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used to enhance the explanatory power of traditional theories of crime. Labeling 
theory seems to be easily receptive to a developmental/life course influence. 
Considering the utility of the life-course perspective, and since it has been 
argued that early labeling theory and research was ill conceived and improperly 
studied, perhaps the traditional self-concept approach should be reconsidered and 
restudied using a developmental/life-course perspective and longitudinal data. Future 
research, then, should also focus on a revised self-concept approach. 
A Revised Self-Concept Perspective on Labeling 
The traditional "self-concept approach" to labeling theory may be revised 
adhering more strictly to developmental/life-coxirse principles. As I mentioned, the 
earlier approach was to examine how labels influence the development of self—how 
we, especially as children, look for information from others in trying to figure out 
who we are. This approach has been the most refuted. However, it may still prove to 
be worthwhile if labeling and self-concept development is re-conceptualized and 
studied properly. The "self-concept" approach still has merit as long as it presents the 
effects of labeling on self-development as an ongoing process. Since social control 
agents, deviant behavior, and self-cognition change as children proceed through life 
stages, we should expect the nature of labeling processes and their outcomes to be 
different accordingly. This is to say that the relationship between societal reactions to 
deviance and self-identity formation is age-graded. One of the ways we can account 
for these kinds of changes is to consider the effects labeling has on children who are 
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in later stages of development of self. It may prove worthwhile to look for alternative 
relationships between self-identity and societal reactions. 
We should not restrict ourselves to examining the impact of labels on changes 
in self-concept, but we should include an examination of the relationship between 
definitions of persons as deviant and pre-existing salient self-concepts. Focusing on 
changes in self-concept may be more appropriate during earlier stages of 
development of self, when children's social identities are less solidified (in other 
words, when they are more "impressionable"). Mead (1934) distinguished between 
the "play" stage and "game" stage. Early in life, through play, children learn to take 
the roles of others and form a subjective understanding of the general view of the 
community—the "generalized other." It is through play that children learn to see 
themselves as objects, through the eyes of others. When children acquire a sense of 
the generalized other, they are able to enter the game stage, which involves a more 
complex understanding of the "rules" of organized social interactions as expected by 
the others in the community. Further, they are more able to understand their 
relationship with the generalized other. After children move from play to game, 
defining and treating them as deviant may take on a different significance, as they 
have grown older and perhaps formed more salient self-concepts. 
At later points in development, labels may serve as signals of affirmation from 
others that one's desired sense of self is secure, even for people defined and labeled as 
deviant. In other words, the reflected appraisals that form when the labeled person 
interprets the responses of the labeler serve to validate the labeled person's self-
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concept(s). Here, the label may provide one with cognitive consistency about 
oneself. In this way, a label term (criminal, poor student, etc.) can work directly and 
immediately, sending information to those defined as deviant that others see them the 
way they wish to be seen, which is important when we consider adolescence as a time 
of identity struggle. For example, one might expect a child who proudly self-
identifies as a "gang member" would, at times, desire reactions from certain 
authorities that confirm s/he is a gang member. Societal reactions such as formal 
records that identify gang members can serve as the basis for reflected appraisals. 
Here, we tell the youth that s/he is indeed a gang member. In contrast to traditional 
versions of labeling and stigmatization processes, this is a case in which a "label" 
does not insult the person but actually complements one's sense of self. Figure 8 
depicts a conceptual model summarizing an identity affirmation argument to labeling 
theory. 
Similarly, deviant behavior may involve a case of "impression management." 
When we engage in impression management, we use gestures to induce desired 
behavior from others that will leave them with a desired impression of us (Goffman, 
1959). Again in contrast to traditional versions of labeling theory, we can turn the 
way we view the label—self-concept relationship around. If reactions to deviant 
behavior can affirm identities, then it stands to reason that individuals may purposely 
choose deviant behavior to bring about these reactions. Thus, some deviant behavior 
may be purposive behavior performed to sustain one's social identity. In this case, the 
danger of definitions of the person as deviant and their corresponding actions is that 
Defined as Treated as 
Illegal » Deviant by • Deviant by 
Behavior Social Control Social Control 
Agents Agents 
Figure 8. An identity affirmation model of labeling theory 
"Reflected" 
Definitions 
Affirm Self-
Identity 
Illegal 
>. Behavior 
(Consistent 
with Identity) 
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they may reinforce deviant behavior. Figure 9 depicts a conceptual model 
summarizing an impression management argument to labeling theory. 
Labeling research traditionally relied on analyses of cross-sectional data 
(Sampson and Laub, 1997), which may help explain labeling theory's deficiency in 
empirical support. Evidence from longitudinal studies is needed to discover ways in 
which childhood personality determines the nature and course of later development 
(Caspi, Elder, and Herbener, 1990). Thus, the self-concept approach may receive 
better support from analyses utilizing longitudinal data. For example, Matsueda 
(1992) used longitudinal data to examine the relationship between reflected appraisals 
and delinquency. He proposed that earlier delinquency influences future delinquency 
through reflected appraisals of juveniles as delinquent—delinquent behavior affects 
parents' definitions of their children as delinquent, which affects their children's self-
definitions as delinquent, which leads to more delinquent behavior on the part of their 
children. The following results of his research supports a conceptualization of 
labeling processes that work through self-definitions. First, parents' initial appraisals 
of their children as "rule violators" were related to their children's self-appraisals as 
"rule violators." Second, prior delinquency was related to further delinquency, as 
well as children's self-appraisals as rule violators, directly and indirectly through 
parent's initial appraisals of children as rule violators. Third, children's self-
appraisals as rule violators were related to later delinquent behavior, and it mediated 
between parental appraisals of them as rule violators and later delinquency. Fourth, 
Definition Illegal Be- Treated as 
of Oneself • havior as • Deviant by -
as Deviant Presentation Social Control 
of Self Agents 
Figure 9. An impression management model of labeling theory 
Sense of Illegal 
> Self • Behavior 
Affirmed (Consistent 
with Identity) 
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parental appraisals of their children as rule violators were directly related to later 
delinquency on the part of their children. 
Although it is important for labeling research to take another look at self-
concept development, it is not the empirical purpose of this analysis to support a re-
conceptualized self-concept approach to labeling theory. Labeling theory may also be 
improved by considering alternatives to the self-concept approach. It is, then, the 
empirical purpose of this analysis to study a more "structural" version of labeling 
theory, presented next. 
Conclusion: Implications for Treatment of Youth Offenders 
In general, labeling theory suggests that we avoid criminal justice system 
involvement for youth as much as possible, especially when public safety is not 
threatened. Thus, one controversy surrounding labeling theory is its implication for 
dealing with law violators. If the theory has merit, then the community is put in a 
double bind. As the theory, and this study, suggests, responses from the criminal 
justice system may play a part in worsening our crime problems. So what do we do 
in response to crime? Should we not punish offenders? Other theory and research 
does well in showing us that not responding to anti-social behavior may also make 
matters worse. Without some kind of response, the offender may have a behavioral 
problem that will persist. Further, members of a community must be protected from 
offenders, which may involve negative sanctions and/or some form of offender 
incapacitation. This double bind may be resolved. Labeling theory does not 
implicate social responses in general as the cause of future deviance, but a certain 
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type—those that stand in the way of future conformity. It is erroneous to draw the 
implication from labeling theory that we should be "soft on crime." Instead, we 
should draw the implication that we need to be very careful about how we attempt to 
deter the offender. All of this leaves us with the question, then: "How do we respond 
to crime?" Some answers may be found in the labeling literature. 
To begin, it is important to remember that labeling a person as deviant may 
turn into a destructive self-fulfilling prophecy. Merton (1957) tells us what we can do 
about the self-fulfilling prophecy. He explains that the key to breaking them lies in 
the definition of the situation. If a situation defined as real can no longer be defined 
as real, then different consequences are likely to come about. Being eternally 
optimistic, I would also add that defining the situation differently to begin with would 
prevent socially destructive consequences. However, Merton said that challenging 
erroneous definitions of the situation is not easy, and he is right. He goes so far as to 
question the human will to do this: "In and of themselves, moral sentiments are not 
much more effective in curing social ills than in curing physical ills" (488). He 
reasons that since our ability to be aware of what we are doing and the moral 
motivation to do the "right thing" are both the products of social forces, we cannot 
simply decrease our propensity to engage in self-fulfilling prophecies out of 
conscious choice alone. With this in mind, he goes on to say that simply "educating" 
people about the nature of self-fulfilling prophecies will not itself disrupt them. 
Merton (1957) is more optimistic about putting an intentional halt to the 
dysfunctional consequences of self-fulfilling prophecies on the macro-social 
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behavioral level. Merton's functionalism recognizes that some social arrangements 
and patterns are socially dysfunctional. In the case of the self-fulfilling prophecy, he 
believes the solution lies in institutional change. He said that we couldn't expect this 
change to happen automatically. Merton (1957: 500) wrote, "The self-fulfilling 
prophecy, whereby fears are translated into reality, operates only in the absence of 
deliberate institutional controls." Certain institutions can provide the sustenance for 
erroneous definitions of situations. Thus, changes in social policies can lead to the 
destruction of self-fulfilling prophecies. 
I agree with Merton (1957) that institutional change is a necessary way to 
disrupt self-fulfilling prophecies. But will attacking self-fulfilling prophecies at the 
institutional level will be enough to disrupt them? I am more optimistic than Merton 
about our potential to realize our own tendencies to commit self-fulfilling prophecies. 
Merton's solution does not suggest what counselors, teachers, parents, law 
enforcement and correctional personnel, and anyone else who works closely with 
troubled youth can do to counter the effects of labeling in their everyday interactions 
with these youth. I am also more optimistic about our ability to make conscious 
moral choices to disrupt them. As active agents, humans have the potential to 
construct different social realities. It is certainly not impossible to neutralize our 
tendency toward self-fulfilling prophecies through introspection. And I would not 
think it impossible to identify individuals who have learned from experience and 
changed their definitions of situations accordingly. 
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Merton (1957) referred to examples involving social institutions and 
organizations, and how they treated entire social categories of people. I would add 
that self-fulfilling prophecies could, and should, also be disrupted at the individual 
behavioral level. Examples of self-fulfilling prophecies that can be disrupted at the 
interpersonal level may include ones made when a parent defines a child as a "bad 
kid," a teacher defines a child as a "bad student," or a counselor defines a child client 
as "incorrigible." Often times, self-fulfilling prophecies arise from interpersonal 
interaction, and thus it may be that disrupting them at the micro-social level is the 
most appropriate strategy in some cases. 
Further I make the case that, sometimes, a self-fulfilling prophecy can be a 
good thing. A statement about reality that is not "true" at the moment it is made 
initiates a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, the statement does not necessarily 
contradict an essential truth; it may simply be something that is just not true yet. Why 
can't the thing we make true be a good thing? Also, I would go as far to recommend 
that we use "favorable" labeling even in instances when we find it hard to resist the 
notion that a label of deviance is warranted. I am talking about a sort of pro-social 
"false definition of the situation" here, or, perhaps, counter-labeling. Even if it 
appears that a child really is a "bad kid," "poor student," or a "gang member," let's 
call this child a "good kid," "good student," or "member of our community." This 
way, the child does not receive appraisals from us that affirm their senses of selves as 
deviant. We can define someone in a flattering way, even without any objective 
essential character of the person to legitimate the definition, and then treat that person 
136 
in a way that empowers that person to be socially constructive. After all, many kids 
commit delinquent acts, sometimes repeatedly, but do not get defined and labeled as 
deviant; many probably are still defined as "good kids." And I speculate that many 
turn out to be "good adults." 
Tannenbaum (1994) suggested that we avoid what he called "the 
dramatization of evil" in responding to a child's deviant behavior. If we are not 
careful, we can make more out of deviant behavior than what it could be. It is this 
dramatization of evil that establishes the importance of being defined as deviant to the 
persons being labeled. If we can downplay or even fail to recognize this importance, 
then our reactions to the deviant behavior of children can have less of an unwanted 
impact on children's self development and maintenance. Tannenbaum (1994: 296) 
writes about those who react hastily to deviant behavior, "The harder they work to 
reform the evil, the greater the evil grows under their hands." Whether we are talking 
about a child who first begins to act in a manner defined as deviant or a young person 
who actively seeks appraisals of themselves as deviant, we may need to go as far as 
ignoring the behavior whenever possible. Tannenbaum (1994: 296) writes further, 
"The way out is through a refusal to dramatize the evil. The less said about it the 
better. The more said about something else, still better." 
Treatment practices should be informed by research implicating the part that 
societal reactions play in generating delinquency continuation factors. Delinquent 
behavior may be sustained by reinforcement (needs satisfaction), deviant self-
identity, presence of weak social controls, and availability of illegal opportunities. 
137 
Conversely, if these factors do not exist, delinquent behavior should discontinue. 
Kaplan (1984: 150) writes: 
The decrease in or discontinuation of delinquent behavior is likely to 
occur to the extent that (1) the delinquent patterns do not appear to satisfy the 
needs that stimulated the delinquent responses, (2) the delinquent behaviors 
stimulate threats to the satisfaction of other needs such as those associated 
with the desire for continuing involvement with conventional morality or with 
fear of formal sanctions, and (3) changes in the youth's needs or in the 
availability of conventional opportunities render delinquent behavior 
unnecessary. 
For example, as Laub and Sampson (1993) suggest, a good job or a good marriage 
increases an ex-offender's stake in conformity and commitment to mainstream 
institutions by eliminating reinforcement of illegal behavior, punishing illegal 
behavior, reinforcing legal behavior, eliminating illegal opportunities, and presenting 
legal opportunities. Thus, our societal reactions to delinquency, such as treatment, 
should not only focus on making illegal behavior unattractive, but we should avoid 
inadvertently reinforcing illegal behavior and narrowing opportunities in favor of 
illegal ones. Our goals should be to facilitate offenders' participation in mainstream 
activities—to integrate them or keep them integrated—as much as possible. 
Braithwaite (1989) argues that the process of labeling and treating persons as 
deviant involves disintegrative shaming (or, non-re-integrative punishment)—societal 
reactions to deviance that prevent offenders from re-entering conventional social 
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environments. Idealistically, in most cases, offenders are allowed a chance to get full 
citizen privileges back after "paying their debt to society." However, certain 
sanctions, making incarceration records known to employers for example, stand in the 
way of community re-integration. This is quite important in that community 
integration reduces the likelihood that one will offend, while community 
disintegration may lead to integration into deviant sub-groups. Punishment delivered 
by agents of social control has a way of attacking the "person." As a way of 
responding to crime, Braithwaite (1989) recommends "reintegrative shaming." His 
well-conceived general model asks us to (1) condemn the harmful behavior 
committed by a person, (2) refrain from defining the person as a deviant object (don't 
label), and (3) keep the person tied to conventional society. I think Braithwaite is 
suggesting here that we punish the behavior, not the person. Whereas disintegrative 
shaming involves practices such as incarceration, reintegrative shaming involves 
programs such as non-punitive community service, conflict management/resolution 
training, victim-offender mediation, and church-sponsored rehabilitation—the same 
types of programs that may also fall under the rubric of "restorative justice" or 
"peacemaking criminology" (Akers, 2000). 
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APPENDIX. MEASUREMENT ITEMS 
Items Used to Measure Deviant Peer Association (Times 1 and 3) 
During the past 12 months, how many of your close friends have... 
1. Run away from home 
2. Skipped school without an excuse 
3. Purposely damaged or destroyed property that did not belong to them 
4. Stolen something worth less than $25 
5. Stolen something worth $25 or more 
6. Gone joyriding, that is, taken a motor vehicle such as a car or motorcycle, for a 
ride or drive without the owner's permission 
7. Hit someone with the idea of hurting them 
8. Attacked someone with a weapon or with the idea of seriously hurting them 
9. Used a weapon, force, or strong arm methods to get money or other things from 
people 
10. Used tobacco (cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, etc.) 
11. Used alcohol (beer, wine, bourbon, vodka, etc.) 
12. Used illegal drugs like marijuana, hashish, LSD, cocaine, downers, crack, etc. 
13. Used prescription drugs for fun or to get "high" 
14. Used inhalants such as solvents, gasoline, rush, or glue 
15. Used nonprescription drugs for fun or to get "high" like Vivarin, No Doz, or diet 
aids 
Items Used to Measure Adult Deviant Peer Association (Time 5) 
During the past 12 months, how many of your close friends have... 
1. Stolen money or something else that does not belong to them 
2. Purposely damaged or destroyed property that does not belong to them 
3. Beat up someone who made them mad 
4. Physically forced someone to do things against their will 
5. Used marijuana (pot, grass) 
6. Used some other illegal drug 
7. Done something that could get them arrested by the police 
8. Used a weapon like a knife, club, or gun to get their own way 
9. Sold stolen goods 
10. Cheated at school or other places 
11. Used someone else's credit card without permission 
12. Written bad checks 
13. Sped or driven recklessly 
14. Driven after drinking 
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15. Sold illegal drugs 
Items Used to Measure Delinquency (Times 1 and 3) 
The following is a list of behaviors related to laws and rules. We'd like to 
know whether you've done any of these things during the past 12 months. This is 
personal and confidential. No one will know how you answered these questions. 
Please be honest in answering them. During the past 12 months, have you... 
1. Run away from home 
2. Taken something worth less than $25 that didn't belong to you 
3. Taken something worth more than $25 that didn't belong to you 
4. Cut classes, or stayed away from school without permission 
5. Beat up on someone or fought someone physically because they made you angry 
(other than just playing around) 
6. Snatched someone's purse or wallet without hurting them 
7. Driven a car when drunk 
8. Been drunk in a public place 
9. Purposely damaged or destroyed property that did not belong to you 
10. Broken into or tried to break into a building just for fun or to look around 
11. Taken a car or other vehicle without the owner's permission, just to drive around 
12. Broken into or tried to break into a building to steal or damage something 
13. Thrown objects such as rocks or bottles at people to hurt or scare them 
14. Attacked someone with a weapon, trying to seriously hurt them 
15. Sold illegal drugs such as pot, grass, hash, LSD, cocaine, or other drugs 
16. Used a weapon, force, or strong arm methods to get money or things from 
someone 
17. Set fire to a building or field or something like that for fun 
18. Sneaked into a movie, ballgame or something like that without paying 
19. Gotten into trouble for driving a car without a license 
20. Gotten a ticket for speeding or other traffic violations in a car 
Items Used to Measure Adult Crime (Time 5) 
The following is a list of behaviors related to laws and rules. We'd like to 
know whether you've done any of these things during the past 12 months. During the 
past 12 months, about how many times did you... (Your best guess please) 
1. Steal money or take something that did not belong to you 
2. Beat up or fight with someone because you were mad at them 
3. Purposely damage or destroy property that did not belong to you 
4. Attack or threaten to attack someone with a weapon like a knife, club, or gun 
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5. Use a weapon, force, or strong arm methods to get money or something else you 
wanted 
6. Drive a car recklessly 
7. Drink and drive 
8. Cheat at school or other places 
9. Sell illegal drugs 
10. Sell stolen goods 
11. Write bad checks 
12. Used someone else's credit card without permission 
Items Used to Measure Criminal Justice System Involvement 
The following is a list of behaviors related to laws and rules. We'd like to 
know whether you've done any of these things during the past 12 months. This is 
personal and confidential. No one will know how you answered these questions. 
Please be honest in answering them. During the past 12 months, have you... 
1. Gone to court or been placed on probation for something you did 
2. Been placed in juvenile detention or jail 
3. Been picked up by the police for something you did 
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